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14. ABSTRACT

This strawman publication provides tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for joint task force staff formulation and deployment and redeployment. It also provides TTPs to assist a joint task force in conducting peace enforcement, peacemaking, peacemaking and humanitarian assistance operations.

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TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES
for
PEACE ENFORCEMENT
PEACEMAKING
PEACEKEEPING
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
JOINT/COMBINED/INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS

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TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES
for
JOINT TASK FORCE STAFF FORMULATION
DEPLOYMENT & REDEPLOYMENT

CHAPTER I

1. Joint Task Force Staff Formulation

a. **Purpose.** This section discusses how a typical JTF Headquarters (HQ) may be organized. It provides a guide for the Commander, Joint Task Force (CJTF) and outlines the general functions of the HQ staff and specific functions of the chief of staff. See Joint Pub 5-00.2 "Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures," September 1991.

b. **Joint Task Force Headquarters Organization.** A joint staff is the staff of the commander of a unified or specified command, of a JTF, or of a subordinate joint component of these commands, which is comprised of significant elements of more than one Service. Staff members should be assigned in a manner that ensures the CJTF understands the tactics, techniques, capabilities, needs, and limitations of the forces component parts. The CJTF organizes the joint staff as necessary to carry out directives. When mission requirements exceed staff capabilities, assistance should be requested through the superior commander. The authority establishing the JTF should make the provision to furnish the necessary personnel, facilities, and equipment. Composition, location, and facilities of the JTF HQ will have a major influence on what the CJTF and his staff can accomplish (e.g., an afloat JTF HQ may have limitations of space and equipment on certain flag ships, which could affect manning levels and equipment capabilities). See Joint Pub 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces," December 1986. A typical staff organization follows:

(1) Principal Staff Officer. The Chief of Staff is the principal staff officer, assistant, and adviser to the commander. The Chief of Staff coordinates and directs the work of the staff divisions. One or more deputies may be provided to assist the Chief and should be from a Service other than the Chief. The Chief ensures required liaison is established with supporting commands and agencies, host nations, US Embassy, Military Advisory Groups, intelligence agencies, and other non-governmental agencies.

(2) Personal Staff Group. Members of the personal staff group perform duties prescribed by the commander and are responsible directly to the commander. This group, normally aides and staff officers handling special matters for the commander's personal control, will usually include political advisers and public affairs officers.

(3) Joint Staff Divisions. The JTF staff divisions correspond to the major functions of command, such as personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, plans, and communications-electronics.

(a) Manpower and Personnel Division (J-1). Charged with manpower management, the formulation of personnel policies, and supervision of the administration of personnel of the command to include DOD civilians and prisoners of war).

(b) Intelligence Division (J-2). Provides sound intelligence on the characteristics of the area and enemy locations, activities, and capabilities. The division actively participates in directing timely intelligence efforts on the essential elements of information (EEI's), enemy items of intelligence interest, and at the proper time, ensures adequate coverage and facilitates dissemination of enemy information as rapidly as possible.

(c) Operations Division (J-3). Assists the Commander in directing and controlling operations, from planning through completion of the specified operations. The division plans, coordinates, and integrates operations for effective unity of effort and clarity of purpose. If the JTF staff includes a Plans Division (J-5), it performs the long-range or future planning responsibilities.

(d) Logistics Division (J-4). Responsible for the logistics plan and coordination with supply, maintenance, repair, evacuation, transportation, construction, and related logistic activities. Many problems confronting the division are generally single-Service in nature, therefore established Military Department policies should be considered.

(e) Plans and Policy Division (J-5). Assists the commander in long-range planning, preparing campaign and outline plans and associated estimates of the situation. The division may contain an analytic cell that conducts simulations and analyses to assist in planning, or the cell may be established as a special staff division or section. When J-5 is not organized, planning functions are performed by J-3.

(f) Communications-Electronics and Automated Systems Division or Command, Control and Communications C^3 Division (normally J-6). Assists the commander with responsibilities for communications-electronics and automation. This includes communication and automation plans to support operational and strategic concepts and provision of communication adequate to exercise command and control.

(4) Special Staff Group. The special staff consists of representatives of technical or administrative services (e.g. legal, chaplain, combat termination, etc.). They generally

provide advice and assistance to the commander and other staff divisions; prepare portions of plans, estimates and orders in which they have interest; and coordinate and supervise their responsible activities. If the JTF staff is organized without a Special Staff Group, the members may be organized as branches of divisions or as additional joint staff divisions.

c. **Joint Task Force Headquarters Functions.** Functions may include, but are not limited to:

(1) Staff.

(a) Planning for deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of the JTF.

(b) Assisting the CJTF to direct, control, and coordinate operations of assigned forces and to coordinate planning activities of subordinate component commands.

(c) Developing courses of action and staff estimates.

(d) Preparing plans or orders based on CJTF decisions.

(e) Providing information to support adjacent commands.

(f) Coordinating with other forces and agencies not assigned.

(g) Coordinating with friendly forces and foreign governments when required by the command establishing the JTF.

(h) Monitoring accomplishment of the CJTF's decisions.

(2) Operations Support Centers

(a) Joint Operations Center (JOC). The CJTF may organize a JOC to serve as the focal point for all operational and intelligence matters. The JOC should be staffed and equipped to receive, store, and display friendly and enemy information; maintain the tactical situation and status of forces; make recommendations; and promulgate CJTF orders in the execution of current operations.

(b) Joint Rescue Coordination Center (JRCC). The CJTF may designate a search and rescue (SAR) coordinator and establish a JRCC at either the JTF HQ or the HQ of the component commander designated the SAR coordinator. If the JRCC is established at the JTF HQ it normally falls under the staff supervision of the J-3. All components provide appropriate supervisory or liaison personnel to staff the JRCC.

(c) Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB). The CJTF's JTCB is comprised of key staff members and a senior representative from each warfighting component. JTCB's advisory focus are: early review of the campaign plan, coordinating targeting information, providing targeting guidance and priorities, preparing and refining the Joint Prioritized Target Lists (JPTL), and providing representatives of all the services and components a mechanism to propose courses of action in the form of targeting guidance. Interposing a JTCB that does anything beyond providing targeting guidance is divisive to the overall effort. An integral interface is the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) who receives objectives, guidance, and intent of the CJTF and advises on the conduct of the joint air effort. The JFACC may be designated the Airspace Control Authority.

d. Joint Task Force Liaison.

(1) Department of State (DOS) or other government and non-government agencies are participants with important, sometimes critical, roles in contingency operations (e.g. military forces conducting Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) will likely operate in support of the DOS). Extensive interaction with nonmilitary assets may influence how military resources are applied. This is a major concern when diplomatic endeavors are normally in the lead.

(2) Liaison officers (LNOs) contribute significantly to an operations success. CJTF should consider liaison requirements early in the planning process. Liaison should be established between the JTF HQ and higher commands, adjacent units, and supporting or assigned forces. LNOs to the JTF HQ perform their duties within the JTF staff division normally responsible for the JTF functions related to the LNOs assigned duties. LNOs are representatives of their commands and should maintain close contact with the JTF joint operations center (JOC) staff and their parent organization. They function as prescribed by their parent unit organizations, with the concurrence of the commander to whom they are assigned to assist. When working with foreign governments and military units, a military coordinating committee, composed primarily of LNOs, is often required to coordinate plans and operations. LNOs must be knowledgeable about capabilities and limitations of their parent units and Service. Without these qualifications, LNOs are of little value. LNOs general responsibilities before, during, and after a tour of duty, are outlined in the following sections.

(a) Operational success or failure is always influenced by a commander's knowledge and use of his forces. As representatives of their parent command to the CJTF, LNOs frequently provide a critical link to effectively coordinate and execute JTF operations.

(b) Liaison Responsibilities

1. Departing for the gaining organization:

a. Thoroughly understand:

(1) The parent unit's current situation.

(2) Parent commander's intent, including details of the concept of operations (e.g., unit locations and combat readiness factors such as personnel strength and logistic considerations, a map with overlays).

(3) The current status and missions of the gaining command.

(4) OPSEC applicable to the mission.

(5) Other units or organizations working with the parent unit.

b. Obtain specific information and liaison requirements from each staff section.

c. Clearly understand mission and responsibilities.

d. Confirm arrangements for communications and transportation.

e. Obtain necessary credentials for identification and appropriate security clearances.

f. If conducting liaison with an allied unit, check language and interpreter requirements.

g. Familiarity with potential issues, capabilities, employment doctrine, and operational procedures of his unit and, to the extent possible, those of the gaining command.

h. Familiarity with command relationships among all major commands, including NGOs and PVOs, participating in the operation.

2. On arrival at the gaining organization:

a. Report to the supported commander or representative (J-3 or Chief of Staff), state mission and exhibit directive or credentials (if in writing), and be prepared to brief them on the parent organization's situation.

b. Network with each staff section, provide information as required, and obtain all required information for transmission to his unit.

c. Establish and maintain communications with the parent organization and update information.

3. During the liaison tour:

a. Keep informed of the situation of the parent organization and facilitate information flow between commands/organization.

b. Find out how the parent organization will be employed (e.g., mission, unit location, future locations, future operations, commander's intent).

c Accomplish duties without interfering with the operations of the gaining headquarters.

d. Report promptly to the parent on organization matters within the scope of the liaison mission or if unable to accomplish the liaison mission.

e. As permitted by official orders, inform the visited commander/supervisor of the content of reports dispatched to the LNO's parent headquarters.

f. Inform the appropriate supported staff officer or commander/supervisor concerning:

(1) Significant problems experienced by the LNO's parent organization that could affect operations.

(2) LNO suggestions to enhance effective employment.

(3) LNO recommendations concerning improved procedures for maximizing effectiveness.

g. Ensure the liaison location at the headquarters is known at all times.

h. Advise parent organization of departure from the liaison location (if possible).

i. Attend daily situation update briefings and other meetings, as required.

j. Keep an appropriate record of actions and reports.

k. Report departure to the supported unit commander/supervisor upon completion.

4. Upon return to the parent organization:

a. Brief the commander/supervisor on pertinent information received during the LNO's visit (e.g., detailed information concerning missions, locations, future locations, and the commander's intent).

b. Transmit promptly any request of the supported commander.

c Transmit information required by higher headquarters in each staff area of responsibility.

d. Transmit mission requirements and requests for information from the supported headquarters.

e. Keep abreast of the situation and be prepared to respond to future liaison requirements.

e. Joint Task Force Staff Training.

(1) The commander of a unified command has the authority and responsibility to ensure joint training is conducted in the command. This authority includes the conduct of joint training exercises deemed necessary for effective employment of assigned forces. In scheduling and defining scenarios for joint exercises, CINCs must recognize the importance of the Service components for developing expertise in their primary functions. This expertise, formed in unit training, provides the basis for effective operations.

(2) Joint training should be conducted in accordance with doctrine for unified operations and training established by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and existing inter-Service agreements. It may be accomplished in the following ways:

(a) Participation of forces in Joint exercises.

(b) Attendance by units of personnel of one Service at schools or training activities of another unified or specified command, Service, agency, or organization.

(c) Participation in exercises of one Service, in the field or at sea, by personnel or units from another Service.

(d) Attendance at joint schools, such as the Joint Staff Officers Course.

(e) Inclusion of courses in the curriculums of appropriate Service schools dealing with other Services and joint matters.

(f) Exchange of personnel among schools, staffs, and units of the respective Services.

(g) Command post exercises and map, chart, and board maneuvers involving two or more Services.

(3) The readiness and training of the joint force is only half the equation. A fully capable joint command element -- supported by a reliable Command, Control, Communication, Computer, and Intelligence (C4I) infrastructure -- to manage contingency or crisis operations is the other half. Senior officers from the unified and component commands provide the pool of trained staff personnel for the selection of the CJTF and subordinate joint functional command elements. Integrating selected officers into on-going joint exercises provides a necessary training vehicle for ensuring the full capability of a joint task force. Training consists of field training exercises or simulation-driven Command Post Exercises (CPX) designed to train JTF commanders and staffs in joint force analysis, planning, coordinating, directing and tracking required during any contingency operations.

2. Deployment/Redeployment.

a. **USTRANSCOM Components.** Commander in Chief United States Transportation Command (CINCTRANS) exercises COCOM over the three transportation component commands (TCC), the Military Sealift Command (MSC), the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), and the Air Mobility Command (AMC). These organizations maintain lift in a constant state of readiness to undertake assigned operations across the operational continuum. MSC, of the US Navy, is the operating agency for ocean and maritime Services. See Joint Pub 4-01.2, "JTTP for Sealift Support to Joint Operations." MTMC, of the US Army, is responsible for common-user land transportation in CONUS, operates common-user ocean terminals throughout the world and monitors movements through all terminals. See Joint Pub 4-01.5, JTTP for Water Terminal Operations." AMC, of the US Air Force, is responsible for strategic airlift worldwide in support of US joint force commanders. In addition, AMC provides theater airlift augmentation forces for CJTF in their theater or area of operations. See Joint Pub 4-01, Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System and Joint Pub 4-01.1, Airlift Support to Joint Operations."

b. **Air Mobility Command (AMC).** Airlift provides Force Enhancement capability. Specific missions airlift provides are; deployment, redeployment, sustainment, employment, aeromedical evacuation, airlift augmentation, and the evacuation of non-combatants from a theater. AMC deployed Missions Support Forces may be used by the CJTF to support theater missions when coordinated with USTRANSCOM.

(1) AMC uses centralized control and decentralized execution. AMC's Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC) commander exercises OPCON. The TACC manages coordinates, controls, and executes strategic air mobility missions through the Director of Mobility Forces (DIRMOBFOR), to the deployed Tanker/Airlift Control Element (TALCE). DIRMOBFOR, previously titled Commander of Mobility Forces (COMMOBFOR), is AMC assigned and deploys to a theater of operations to exercise OPCON of theater assigned airlift and aerial refueling assets for the CINC and Air Force Component Commander (AFCC). Additionally, this person monitors and manages those CINCTRANS-assigned airlift, aerial refueling, and AMC mission support forces operating in or transiting the theater. Some of the issues DIRMOBFOR is concerned with follow:

(a) Crisis Action Procedures. Initial update on response and intelligence briefing, Crisis Action Teams are formed, CINC's recommended course of action, stage of airlift/tanker flow development, AMC mission support forces (TALCE) status and primary locations, name and location of AMC liaison officer, host nation coordination requirements, and US Embassy involvement and requirements.

(b) Plans. Availability of OPLAN or CONPLAN for the situation, major forces to be moved, identity of component validators (designated service or component individuals with approval authority of mission necessity), the major APOD/APOE and air bridge locations, the size and timing of the flow, if any augmentation forces are required, and proposed beddown locations for forces.

(c) Command Relationships. Identify the supported CINC or CJTF and supporting CINC's, identify the major component commanders, possible joint special operations task force who will use AMC assets for employment operations, and who will validate airlift/tanker request.

(d) Predeployment. Tailoring the staffs for deployment into theater to support the courses of action, personal items requirements i.e. weapons, chemical gear, special gear. communications, etc., is the joint movement center set up, and airbase defense.

(e) Validation. Theater airlift movement must be validated through the Joint Movement Center (JMC). If there are more requirements than capabilities, the Joint Transportation Board (JTB) will set the priority. Validation for theater tanker mission is normally set by the AFFOR and generally receives the priority of the theater air mission they are designed to support. These decisions are ultimately determined by the AFFOR and DIRMOBFOR. Medevac missions are validated by the Joint Medical Regulating Authority (JMRO) and tasked through the Aeromedical Evacuation Control Center (AECC). The AECC assigns medical evacuation missions to aeromedical evacuation elements and monitors patient movement. Source. "Commander of Mobility Forces," handbook, May 1992, prepared by the Air Mobility School.

(2) The mission support forces' TALCE, is a deployable cell consisting of C2, weather, communications, maintenance, security, transportation, intelligence, and other support agencies, tailored to meet specific mission objectives. This nucleus controls the activities at the offload/onload site. AMC mission support forces should be first into an operating area to develop the throughput capability. A deployed TACC or TALCE, tailored to the mission is necessary for a quick and efficient response by airlift.

(3) Airspace coordination is of paramount importance for the JFACC to administer. Airspace management is critical to controlling the JTF area of responsibility and safe passage of supporting aircraft in meeting the JTF objectives. Integration of air command and control procedures with the host nation is necessary to ensure safety and security of all forces. The component Command and Control Systems must interface with joint and combined air command and control systems.

(4) Airbase Defense is a critical rear area defense requirement. Planning and implementation procedures are covered in Joint Pub 3-10, "Joint Rear Area Operations," and 3-10.1, "JTTP for Installation Defense."

c. **Maritime Prepositioning Force.** Maritime Prepositioning Force(MPF) operations are a strategic deployment option. This operation uses equipment and supplies prepositioned aboard forward deployed Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) and a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), along with a Navy Support Element (NSE) that are airlifted by AMC into an arrival and assembly area (AAA) to assemble with their equipment in preparation for operations ashore. MPF permits rapid deployment while amphibious operations provide the means for forcible entry. The MPF purpose is to rapidly establish a MEB ashore and arrive with sustainment for thirty days operations. MPF operations occur in four phases: planning, marshaling, movement, and arrival and assembly. An MPF operation is complete when the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) is established ashore and ready for employment.

(1) The MPF has a command element, a MEB, and MPS squadron, and an NSE. The Commander, Maritime Prepositioning Force (CMPF) is a Navy officer designated in the initiating directive for MPF operations and is analogous to the Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF) in amphibious operations. MPF reinforcement operations reinforce amphibious operations while all other MPF operations are defined as independent. For movement the MPF is divided into sea and air movement groups. The sea movement group includes the MPS squadron and support

forces, as assigned. Those forces that deploy by air are called the fly-in-echelon (FIE). These include the Off-load Preparation Party (OPP), Survey Liaison and Reconnaissance Party (SLRP), advance party, main body, and flight ferry (FF). Sea movements are planned by the fleet while responsibility for air movement rests with the Fleet Marine Force (FMF), in coordination with CINCTRANS. Supported and supporting CINCs must coordinate the movement of AMC and MEB aircraft to avoid saturation of onload bases, en route support bases, and arrival airfield(s).

(2) Arrival and assembly is the final and most crucial phase of the MPF operation. The unified commander designates an AAA. The AAA is administrative in nature and does not denote command of a geographic area. Arrival and Assembly organizations are provided from the deploying MEB and NSE. An Arrival and Assembly Operations Group (AAOG) is formed which plans, coordinates, and provides control for the off-load and subsequent association of equipment and supplies with arriving organizations. Other task organizations include the Arrival Assembly Support Party (AASP) consisting of the Port Operations Group (POG), Beach Operations Group (BOG), and the Arrival Airfield Control Group (AACG). Efficient off-load of airlift aircraft requires close coordination with the AMC TALCE to preclude saturation of the arrival airfield(s). The offload of equipment and supplies is the responsibility of the NSE. USN or USMC advance party groups, tailored to the mission support necessary, should arrive in the area of operations early. They provide over the shore or ocean port operations skills plus coordinate host nation support and initial contracting. Six conditions required in order to establish a MEB ashore:

(a) A secure area from initiation of strategic deployment through completion of arrival and assembly;

(b) Adequate strategic airlift and aerial tanker support;

(c) Adequate off-load forces (NSE, AAOG, etc.) to support the operation;

(d) Adequate airfield for AMC aircraft operations, commercial and military, for throughput capability to support the intended air flow;

(e) Adequate port/beach for timely off-load and throughput. The port must have sufficient water depth, adequate overhead clearance, and sufficient maneuvering room to admit MPS ships;

(f) Adequate road network between the port/beach and proximate airfield to permit a secure and timely arrival and assembly of airlifted units with their sealifted equipment and supplies.

d. Other Deployment Considerations.

(1) Civil Affairs (CA) units. CA units are specifically structured to serve as the commander's executive agent for vital military operations. For this reason, CA units should be among the first considered for inclusion in HA operations. CA units will be able to perform the following missions:

(a) Coordinate Foreign Nation and Host Nation support.

(b) Provide civil administration support to a friendly or allied government.

(c) Conduct area assessments and assist in preparing area studies.

(d) Conduct humanitarian and civil assistance activities.

(e) Identify political, economic, and social vulnerabilities.

(f) Advise commanders on conduct of civil military operations.

(g) Conduct dislocated civilian operations, including operations of camps.

(h) Provide CA liaison and coordination.

(i) Conduct NEO.

(j) CA units should be considered to assist in closing out the mission. CA units can assist in the following:

1. Identify political, economic, and social vulnerabilities.

2. Provide advice on civil military operations.

(2) PSYOP units. PSYOP units are capable of developing and executing PSYOP themes, providing a critical link to the refugees and warring factions in the form of leaflets and loudspeaker broadcast. Additionally, PSYOP units can plan and conduct counter-propaganda operations and provide advice and assistance on the planning and conduct of tactical deception operation. Stay behind PSYOP units are needed to assist in the planning and conduct of counterpropaganda operations and other PSYOP missions as appropriate.

(3) Area Study. At the beginning of a HA operation, the logistical planner should study the background of the people and the area involved. This will allow for the procurement of food staples for the target population and will prevent waste of valuable food items and support assets.

(4) Logistics Recovery support. In the initial phase, it is important to have a well-planned recovery operation that provides for a quick-response recovery in a tactical environment. Because vehicles that are used to transport large amounts of food over long distances inevitably break down, a recovery plan ensures the timely delivery of supplies and provides for adequate security to remain with the main body.

(5) Linguist and soldiers familiar with the region. The lack of language qualified personnel and the initial difficulties in finding and hiring interpreters may initially hamper the relief effort. The process for identifying qualified individuals needs to be established early on. Additionally, individuals with experience and knowledge of the host nation or region should be requested for assignment to the deploying staff. Lessons learned shows the value of having service members familiar with the area--these service members' personal relationships with host nation personnel and knowledge of doing business within the community can greatly facilitate coordination.

(6) Communications. Early HA operations require sophisticated communications down to JTF level. Single channel TAC SAT is not sufficient to meet the requirement. To ensure an adequate communications package accompanies the JTF, deploy communications units designed and equipped to support Echelons Above Corps (EAC) units.

(7) Engineer support. Constructing everything from latrines to compound boundaries to living areas requires engineer support. An advanced party of engineers is needed to make an assessment of the operation's engineer requirements and to provide advice on the proper engineer units to task.

(8) Water assessment, storage and distribution. During the planning stage of an operation of this nature, a complete and detailed evaluation of water supply sources need to be completed. Included in the in the evaluation should be the quantity and quality of water source, transportation assets available and necessary to deliver the water to its users, mechanical improvements necessary at the supply point including personnel skills and equipment necessary these improvements, and electrical improvements necessary at the supply point including emergency power requirements, electrical spare parts, skilled electricians, and generator repairman necessary to keep these systems operational.

(9) Strategic lift. Force projection and sustainment success is based on the strategic mobility triad (airlift, sealift, and prepositioning). Deploying forces can improve the impact of airlift and sealift capabilities by preparing unitized loads of ammunition, supplies and equipment. Airflow and seaflow need to be coordinated to ensure effective receptions of units in theater, that is, arrival of service members match the arrival of equipment.

(10) Postal procedures. Need to establish procedures early on for getting mail to the JTF. Lost, missing or displaced mail can have a drastic effect on the moral of the troops

(11) Medical support. Preventive medical operations should be a number one priority. Poor sanitary conditions and lack of potable water can cause severe health problems. Contaminated water can lead to wide spread out breaks of disease.

(12) Contracting. Units should plan to fill low-dollar-value requirements (less than $2500) through the use of ordering officers appointed from within the unit. The selection and training of these ordering officers must be accomplished prior to deployment. Installation directorates of contracting can provide the necessary training and appointments.

(13) Hand off of mission to the United Nations or appropriate agency. Eventually the effort will be turned over to the HA or appropriate agency. Key staff officers will have to stay behind to ensure a smooth transition.

(14) Decontamination. Coordinate with airport and seaport agencies for the decontamination and preparation for shipment of personnel and equipment.

PEACE-ENFORCEMENT, PEACEMAKING, and PEACEKEEPING

CHAPTER II

1. General. This chapter provides tactics, techniques, and procedures to assist a joint Task force (JTF) staff in conducting peace-enforcement and peacemaking operations. It also provides general guidance for the JTF to consider when transitioning to a neutral peacekeeping operation.

a. **Combined Operations Considerations.** The effectiveness of combined operations may be improved when the following topics are considered:

(1) Respect. Respect your combined partners, their ideas, culture, religion and customs. This respect (consideration and acceptance), shows each combined partner he/she is important part of the alliance or coalition.

(2) Mission Assignment. Assign missions appropriate to each combined partner's capabilities. Combined partner's opinions should be sought during the planning process. It should be remembered that national honor and prestige may significantly impact mission assignment

(3) Management of Resources. Ensure combined partners have resources necessary to accomplish their assigned missions. Cross-leveling between partners may be required.

(4) Harmony. Establish rapport with senior combined commanders. This is a personal, direct relationship that only the commanders can develop. The keys are respect, trust, and ability to compromise. The result will be successful teamwork and unity of effort.

(5) Liaison and Coordination Centers. Ensure concerted action through liaisons and coordination centers. The ability to communicate in the combined partner's native language is important because it enhances and facilitates these activities.

(6) Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability (RSI). The objectives of RSI are to enable all combined partners to operate together in the most effective manner and to make the most efficient and economical use of resources. Standardization agreements are the result of RSI efforts in alliances. These agreements may be appropriate for rapid adoption by coalitions.

(7) Unity of Effort. Ensure all combined members' efforts are focused on a common goal.

(8) Combined Capabilities. Know and understand the capabilities of combined partners as well as or better than you know the enemy, from movement and maneuver to logistical support.

b. **Special Considerations.** JTF members may encounter unique circumstances that could hinder their mission if they are not aware of these circumstances. For example, differing cultural practices, as well as host nation drug use and availability, may impact on the JTF. Awareness and education are key. Pre- and post-deployment briefings on unusual cultural practices should be given.. All personnel should be aware of the unique aspects of the situation, culture, and social environments they might face. In the case of Somalia, forces will be exposed to an unfamiliar threat related to the Somalis' use of khat (pronounced "*cat*"). Khat is an organic amphetamine-like drug. (also found in eastern Africa and SW Asia). Khat "chewing" (leaves and stems of the plant) induces psychotic reactions which can spur acts of violence. Reportedly, since khat keeps the consumer awake and high for hours, rival Somali warlords kept their young zealots amply supplied with khat to fuel their fighting spirit. Although banned four years ago, the "chewing" practice continues unabated. Khat chewing has become the Somalis afternoon "coffee break." Typically, this practice begins after 1300 hours and in many cases lasts the rest of the day, which means that Somalis do not come down from their intoxicating high until the following dawn.

2. Peace Enforcement. Military intervention to forcefully restore peace between belligerents who may be engaged in combat is a peace-enforcement operation. This section highlights intelligence requirements; security of the force; United Nations interface to affect turnover to a peacekeeping operation; interagency support and control; command, control, and communications (C^3); rules of engagement; prisoners of war; and special operations forces. These topics are important in understanding a peace-enforcement operation.

a. **Intelligence Requirements.** Intelligence requirements and functions are formulated based on operational needs as directed by the JTF commander. The primary purpose is to provide the JTF commander quality intelligence information about the enemy which is essential to making sound military decisions. [The term enemy is generic in this document; it may equate to either adversary or belligerent.]

(1) Commanders need an assessment of the enemy's capabilities to use military forces as well as host nation belligerent elements, e.g., guerrillas, terrorists, drug traffickers, gangs, black marketers, looters, etc. Therefore, commanders should prepare a Military Capabilities Assessment which includes:

(a) Leadership and command and control (C^2). How enemy commanders direct their forces to accomplish a designated mission.

(b) Order of battle. Identification of force components and assessment of the strength, structure, and disposition of the personnel and equipment of the adversary military force.

(c) Force readiness and mission. The readiness and anticipated actions of a force to achieve its objectives. Force readiness includes the interrelationships among units in a single force and in combined-arms operations.

(d) Force sustainability. The ability of the force to maintain the level and duration of combat activity necessary to achieve objectives.

(e) Technical intelligence. The technical sophistication of forces, units, and weapon systems, as well as their capabilities, constraints, and countermeasures.

(2) Commanders should prepare an Enemy Courses of Action Estimate. This estimate probes the mind of the enemy commander to "see" the situation through the enemy's eyes. Thus, the JTF commander will better understand how the adversary will conceptualize the situation, what options may be considered, and how the enemy may react to our actions.

(3) In addition to the normal intelligence requirements, some operations may need cultural assessments. This information can be important in shaping certain decisions and in dealing with the belligerent parties. It can also affect psychological operations and how themes are developed to influence events. Therefore, commanders should identify the requirement to receive briefings from country-specific or regional desk analysts as well as country study type materials. This information may become the basis for valuable Essential Elements of Information (EEIs). Examples include: political and tribal structure; lifestyle habits such as food, clothing, etc.; leaders and military organizations, and the background and history of the conflict.

(4) Commanders should request automatic intelligence release authority for multi-national operations.

b. **Security of the Force.** Given the ultimate objective of restoring the situation to its original, pre-conflict condition, US forces can expect to be exposed to an enemy force in a hostile environment during a peace enforcement role. As a result, force protection for a deployed peace enforcement joint task force must be a high priority and requires similar considerations to those same threats posed to traditional conventional combatant operations. In this volatile, dynamic environment, security requirements will need continuous refinement or modification to adapt to the changing situation. The JTF commander is responsible for setting and enforcing minimum standards of physical security for US forces. A principal item of force protection is intelligence, particularly as it applies to the known opposition as well as identifying unknown enemies such as terrorist groups, gangs, drug traffickers, and other subversive or criminal elements. The requirement to provide continuous security while conducting peace enforcement operations is a complex task.

(1) Security procedures should be established and then reviewed on a regular basis. The following actions may be helpful:

(a) The JTF commander should appoint a security designee who will conduct assessments, provide written guidance to include the establishment of Threat Conditions, and brief the JTF staff as appropriate. As a minimum, vigilance and the avoidance of predictable patterns should be stressed. Depending on the situation and commander's desires, a Force Protection Summary should be provided daily.

(b) Contact personnel from the Air Force Office of Special Investigations who can provide expert assistance in conducting security assessments and aid in establishing required procedures.

(c) Consider multiple sources, such as local national contacts (derived from HUMINT collection), who can provide excellent updates, particularly regarding activities and threats posed by various terrorists groups. These sources can provide information which will permit threat condition adjustments and implementation of appropriate security measures.

(d) Security operations will likely include clearing anti-personnel mines in the area of operations. Other nations may be involved in this operation and may consist of security forces capable of conducting a variety of missions. For example, during Operation "Provide Comfort," the French provided Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams to clear dangerous mines emplaced by both sides during the Kurdish-Iraqi conflict. Additionally, they provided units to clear routes and assisted in establishing security zones.

(2) If roadblocks are required, ensure proper roadblock procedures are established. Military police forces should establish and maintain the roadblocks. However, if military police forces are not available, whatever security forces are in the area should assume the responsibility. At minimum, ensure the area is highly visible, and that it is a defendable position with an armed overwatch area 25-30 meters beyond the checkpoint.

Part of being visible will be the need to have bilingual warning signs. The layout should resemble an obstacle course requiring extensive maneuvering. Barrels can be used for this purpose or an engineer construction unit can assist in preparing barricades. Consideration should be given to a layout which will accommodate large and small vehicles. Also consider convenience for the military traffic which will transverse the same area.

(3) Indications of instability related to force protection, as well as identification of voids in the collection plan, may identify potential threats to the force. Real-world data (provided through existing intelligence channels), and the Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) Instability Indicators Study, published by the Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict in June 1992, can be used to develop a threat assessment. [A copy of the LIC Instability Indicators Study is attached to this document.]

c. **United Nations Interface to Affect Turnover to A Peacekeeping Operation**

(1) Because military actions in peace-enforcement may hinder peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts, military plans and operations should be reviewed from a political angle to identify actions that could have negative impacts on peacemaking and peacekeeping operation (PKO). This can be especially critical if US forces become part of the PKO forces. Neutrality is paramount for a PKO force; therefore, if military actions in peace-enforcement operations have alienated portions of the local population, PKO may be unnecessarily difficult, if not impossible, to conduct.

(2) When the belligerent parties to a dispute agree to a cease-fire, the peace-enforcement operation transitions to a peacekeeping operation. Due to the paramount need for the PKO force to be neutral, it is extremely unlikely the JTF force will assume PKO duties. However, if a PKO force is not able to immediately deploy to the area, the JTF may be asked to begin the PKO and transition to the approved PKO force when they arrival. Therefore, the following items should be accomplished to assist with the transition:

(a) Read Joint Pub 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations. [The most current version is the August 1992 Revised Final Draft; definitions were changed in Dec 92.]

(b) Plan for a change in mission and training requirements of personnel. Specifically, identify personnel for the PKO force, then provide them initial training and place them on standby. Additionally, identify actions that initiate the phases of the withdrawal of peace-enforcement forces.

d. **Interagency Support and Control**

(1) Participating organizations that should be contacted for more information on interagency support and control are highlighted below. A list of applicable points of contact (agency, name, address, and phone number, where available) is provided in Appendix B. In all cases, however, a chain of command relationship should be established for all participants, Global Positioning Systems should be acquired for non-military agencies to report positions, and standardized maps should be used by all participating organizations. The interagency organizations that should be contacted are:

(a) The US Diplomatic Mission and Country Team. The US diplomatic mission to a host nation includes representatives of all US departments and agencies physically present in the country. The chief of the diplomatic mission, normally an Ambassador, provides direction and control over all US in-country government personnel. This authority does not extend to personnel in other missions or those assigned to either an international agency or to a combatant commander. A crisis may arise where the US has no diplomatic mission. In this situation the President may send a representative with instructions that vary from the standard authorities and responsibilities of a chief of mission.

(b) The United Nation Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM).

(c) The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). UNHCR has a major role in coordinating aid to refugees, returnees, and displace persons. Except in special circumstances, its material assistance activities are conducted through national or local authorities of the country concerned, other organizations of the UN system, non-governmental organizations, or private technical agencies. Coordination with the UNHCR is critical for any humanitarian relief effort. Failure to coordinate with UNHCR before and during the operation, or failure meet UNHCR standards, may preclude the UNHCR from accepting transfer of equipment, supplies, and facilities as the military disengages. To preclude this, a working relationship should be established with UNHCR immediately upon notification of a mission with UNHCR. A copy of the UNHCR text that outlines specifications for refugee camp construction should be obtained from the civil affairs command or from one of the offices mentioned in Appendix B.

(d) Other agencies to contact as appropriate are higher headquarters, United Nations or subordinated organizations, e.g., UNOSOM, US Embassy and coalition embassies in the host nation, Department of State Task Force (Task Force Somalia), UNHCR (International, UN, and US Offices), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), DART, etc., should also be contacted as appropriate.

(2) Liaison Officers. Individuals serving as liaison officers (LNOs) may be able to help resolve interagency problems by establishing a chain of command and chain of control for all participating organizations. Individuals who serve as LNOs should be top-quality and have sufficient rank and authority appropriate to their level of liaison.

(3) Mission, objectives, and tasks. The LNOs can assist in identifying the mission, objectives, and tasks of all interagency participants. Additionally, they can help identify on-the-scene individuals who can provide an estimate of the situation to allow rapid adjustments to mission and tasks as needed. Exchanging LNOs capable of effecting mission and task changes is another possibility for improved interagency support. Finally, by providing clear communications throughout the chain of command, to include non-military organizations, issues may be resolved by presenting a balanced interagency view.

(4) Communications. Direct communications among commanders, to include non-military organizations, should be provided to facilitate decision-making. The following actions should be taken to ensure communications are viable.

(a) Identify interoperability of communications equipment among all participants. International Maritime Satellite (INMARSAT) terminals provide an option. This satellite network can provide worldwide voice, data, and facsimile communications. This would be an excellent communications link between the military and non-military organizations, e.g., US Liaison Office and Embassies, Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART), (ICRC), United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), inbound shipments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) private volunteer organizations (PVOs), etc.

(b) Exchange standard operating procedures (SOPs) among all participants.

(c) Standardize similar reports.

(d) Exchange quality LNOs of sufficient rank to effect coordination.

(e) Plan for the increase of communications equipment, nets, commercial lines, etc., as the operation continues.

(f) Identify secure and protected communications requirements, e.g., nets, equipment, lines, operators, storage, etc.

(5) The authorities and responsibilities of the Chief of the American Diplomatic Mission or Presidential Envoy should be identified. This information is normally provided to the combatant commander and therefore may be readily available; however, the following are also potential sources for the information: the Department of State, Regional Bureau Chief for the country involved, or the political advisor to the combatant commander.

(6) Interagency command and control during cross-border emergencies. The US Ambassador to the host nation normally exercises command and control in the interagency environment. However, this control may be complicated when cross-border emergencies such as civilians crossing international borders, attacks against refugee camps for supplies, etc., take place. Therefore, command and control procedures addressing cross-border situations should be established at the interagency level as soon as possible.

(7) Terrorism. If the host nation is not able to adequately protect itself from acts of terrorism, the US Department of State should be contacted to provide support through their antiterrorism assistance (ATA) program to teach host nation officials governance and law enforcement. The latter should include how to maintain the internal security of the nation. In particular, Federal Aviation Administration instruction on airport procedures and security should be included.

e. Command, Control, and Communications (C^3)

(1) There are two options for command and control organization of multinational force:.

(a) Lead Nation. Multinational partners place peace enforcement forces under control of a single nation's military commander. They initiate and integrate staff augmentation from all nations of the multinational force into the controlling headquarters. This simplifies unity of command and enhances mission accomplishment.

(b) Parallel. Multinational partners elect to retain control of their national forces. Coordination cells should be formed to provide interface between the participating nations and their forces. Establishment of robust liaison teams equipped to maintain continuous communications with their parent headquarters also becomes advantageous.

(2) Interoperability of communications equipment for multinational forces. Robust liaison teams equipped to maintain continuous communication with their parent headquarters should be established to deal with this important issue..

f. Rules of Engagement (ROE)

(1) Classifying ROE. Consideration should be given to classifying the ROE. The advantage of classifying ROE is that it provides added protection for the force by not telling the enemy what actions are considered hostile. The disadvantage in classifying ROE is that dissemination to the lowest levels and to allies may be precluded by the requirement to safeguard ROE. Unclassified ROE in the form of Commander's Guidance on the Use of Force could be developed in the event ROE remains classified. This could then be disseminated to all coalition forces.

(2) Rules of Engagement versus Commander's Guidance on the Use of Force. Consider changing the term Rules of Engagement (ROE) to the term Commander's Guidance on the Use of Force. This language is purposely chosen instead of the term rules of engagement in order to dispel any illusions that the allies are at war, as well as to emphasize the humanitarian assistance aspect of the operation. An example of Commander's Guidance on the Use of Force follows:

(a) This is a humanitarian assistance operation. The multinational forces are not at war.

(b) You have the right to use force in self-defense. Nothing in the guidance negates a commander's obligation to take all necessary actions for the unit's self-defense.

(c) JTF forces are authorized to use force in self-defense when responding to attacks or threats of imminent attack against the multinational forces, humanitarian relief personnel, or refugees.

(d) Use only the minimum force necessary and proportional to eliminate the threat and control the situation.

(e) Deadly force should only be used to protect lives in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent.

(f) You will disarm and detain any soldier or member of a paramilitary security force, or any civilian policeman without proper authorization, within a designated security area. Immediately contact the Military Coordination Center through your chain of command.

(g) Use the minimum force necessary to disarm and detain, up to and including the use of deadly force, if hostile intent is exhibited or a hostile act committed.

(3) Supplemental Control Measures. Supplemental control measures are procedural steps taken to ensure security of the

JTF. Hostile threats to the JTF must be continually assessed throughout the operation. Security against terrorist threats such as using barriers and obstacles along key avenues into positions must be considered. These measures may consist of Weapon Control Status (WCS), No-fly zones, security zones (Green Line), checkpoints, and other techniques. In all cases, implementing these measures must take into account their effect on the situation, and they must be coordinated with the proper authorities.

(4) Request Channels for Rules of Engagement. The JTF staff need to know the request channels for ROE as well as the procedures to obtain approval for recommended changes to the ROE. Because ROE are developed with political considerations in mind, they normally come from JCS-level decisions. However, changes to the ROE may result from immediate tactical emergencies at the JTF level. Accordingly, the JTF staff should have access to the immediate means to request and obtain changes to the ROE. Situations requiring an immediate change to the ROE could be introduction of combat forces from a hostile nation; attacks by sophisticated weapon systems including nuclear, biological, or chemical; or incidents resulting in loss of life of the JTF. These situations should be wargamed by the JTF staff and the request channels exercised.

(5) ROE Intent. Rules of engagement seldom anticipate every situation. Commanders and leaders at all levels must understand the intent of the ROE and act accordingly despite any military disadvantage that may occur. The commander responsible for ROE formulation should consider including an intent portion that describes the desired end-state as well as conflict-termination. This will assist commanders and leaders at all levels in situations not clearly addressed in an operations order.

(6) Hostile Criteria Formulation. Hostile criteria formulation determines the basic rules the JTF uses to determine friend or foe. These rules can apply to aircraft, equipment, units, or individuals, and are developed with consideration of the threat and their effect on the situation. Identification authority is the level of command with the ability and authority to determine a hostile act. It may be as low as the individual soldier or as high as an Air Defense Reporting Sector in the case of a no-fly zone. The engagement authority should be considered in conjunction with the identification authority; the two may not be the same. In most cases, however, identification authority can be delegated to lower levels.

g. **Enemy Prisoners of War.** In the context of this TTP, the terms enemy prisoners of war (EPW) and displaced civilians (DC) may require similar planning and coordination.

(1) Reception of EPWs. As a minimum, initial reception procedures for EPWs should address the following:

(a) Accepting EPWs at any time - day or night.

(b) Providing emergency medical care for seriously sick or wounded.

(c) Providing food, water, and shelter.

(d) Providing separate facilities to maintain necessary segregation.

(2) Processing of EPWs. The following processing should be accomplished within several hours after each EPW's arrival:

(a) Initial screening of prisoners to determine their classification according to status such as officer, enlisted, or civilian. This initial information should answer the questions: who, what, when, where, how, and why.

(b) Physical inspection by medical personnel to determine health status and hospitalization requirements.

(c) Issuance of clean clothing and toilet articles.

(d) Issuance of blankets and bath towels.

(3) There is a potential language barrier for US military personnel conducting EPW operations. To overcome this potential barrier, signs should be constructed Construct signs and cassette messages for EPWs should be recorded outlining the following:

(a) Signs for camp rules.

(b) Signs for daily activities.

(c) Recorded cassette tape with camp orientation message.

(4) When selecting the EPW location consider the following criteria:

(a) Whether a EPW population interned in the area being considered will pose a potentially serious threat to the logistical support operation should the tactical situation become critical.

(b) The attitude of the local civilian population.

(c) The attitude of the prisoners; i.e., friendly and cooperative or actively hostile and uncooperative.

(d) Terrain considerations as related to camp construction and as they may help or hinder the probability of successful escape. Additionally, location should be defendable against attacks.

(e) Distance from the source of logistical support and methods of transportation required and available for the transport of personnel, supplies, and equipment.

(5) EPW facility construction requirements. Construction requirements for an EPW facility will largely depend on the estimated capture rate; however, the following are construction standards to satisfy minimum requirements.

(a) A double-barbed wire fence around the perimeter of each of the enclosures composing the EPW facility.

(b) Adequate guard towers on the perimeter.

(c) Latrine facilities for both male and female prisoners.

(d) Adequate lighting throughout the camp, especially around the perimeter.

(e) A pit area for burning trash.

(f) Landing zone large enough for at least two helicopters to land at the same time.

(g) Adequate road network to the EPW facility.

(h) Adequate shower facilities.

(6) Logistics considerations

(a) EPW facilities should reflect, as appropriate, considerations of the following:

1. Existence of an adequate and satisfactory source of water supply, to include a consideration of amounts required for drinking, cooking, laundry and bath, and disposal of sewerage.

2. The availability of suitable existing facilities to avoid unnecessary construction materials.

3. The local availability of construction materiels.

4. The local availability of an electric power supply. Restriction of the use of generators to a standby or emergency source of electricity is preferred.

(b) Logistics requirements may become intensive based on the environment and estimated capture rate; however, the following logistics package satisfies the minimum requirements:

1. Cots.

2. Tentage.

3. Blankets.

4. Bath towels.

5. Shower shoes.

6. Concertina wire.

7. Lumber for guard towers and tent floors.

8. Water containers.

9. Paper products, e.g., plates, knives, spoons, forks, and cups.

10. Health and comfort packs for prisoners.

11. Medical supplies to accommodate sick and wounded prisoners.

12. Rubber gloves for U.S. military personnel.

13. Clothing for EPWs, as necessary.

(7) Location of military intelligence personnel and interpreters. Military intelligence personnel and interpreters should be with the unit assigned to conduct the EPW mission. This ensures immediate screening of prisoners and provides time-sensitive intelligence information to commanders.

(8) Limited interpreter support. To assist with the EPW mission, the JTF staff may hire local civilians to be interpreters, or they may request volunteers from the host nation. The estimated prisoner capture rate will determine the total number of interpreters required.

(9) Consideration for EPW religious practices. Ensure religious practices for EPWs are considered and allow them appropriate time for prayer.

(10) Accountability of EPWs. Accounting for EPWs by identification bracelets, hand stamps, or tags will assist with record keeping. Additionally, software programs currently exist to establish a data base which provides a efficient and timely means to account for prisoners.

(11). Discipline and control of EPWs. All EPWs must be treated fairly, but firmly, at all times. Commanders should ensure each order is reasonable, capable of being obeyed, and is given in a manner and language which the prisoners can clearly understand, e.g., printed signs and orientation cassette tapes.

(12) Transportation of EPWs from collection points to an EPW facility. Units evacuating EPWs should take maximum advantage of all types of transportation, including logistical back-haul. [Airlift evacuation utilizing helicopters and C-130 aircraft proved to be the most efficient means during operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM.]

(13). Protection against infectious disease. US military personnel tasked to perform the EPW mission should wear adequate protective clothing to prevent them from contracting an infectious disease. Additionally, laundry and bath units should be available to support the EPW mission.

(14). Treatment of EPWs. Ensure US military personnel assigned to the EPW mission understand that treatment of all prisoners is always in accordance with the Geneva Conventions and other applicable international laws.

h. **Special Operations Forces - Roles and Missions.** Special Operations Forces (SOF) roles and missions in peace-enforcement will be tactical combat operations with the careful use of combat power to bring about the end of hostilities between the belligerent parties thus setting the stage for the transition to a peacekeeping role.

(1) Psychological operations (PSYOP) roles and missions include the use of the media to convey selected information and influence the emotions, reasoning, and behavior of the belligerent parties. Typical PSYOP missions in peace enforcement are:

(a) Strategic

1. Clarifying US policies and actions.

2. Promoting understanding.

3. Undermining hostile power's intent.

4. Supporting deception efforts.

(b) Operational

1. Preparing the indigenous population for introduction of US forces.

2. Undermining enemy leaders.

3. Explaining US actions.

4. Conducting counterpropaganda.

5. Supporting deception operations.

(c) Tactical

1. Lowering enemy morale.

2. Inducing the enemy to surrender.

3. Creating favorable US image.

4. Assisting in deception operations.

5. Confusing and harassing the enemy.

(2) Civil Affairs. Civil Affairs (CA) roles and missions in peace-enforcement can be conducted to assist the commander in two ways: civil administration, and civil-military operations

(a) Civil Administration involves:

1. Support to foreign governments to maintain stability.

2. Temporary responsibility for administration to maintain or restore essential services and maintain order.

(b) Civil-Military Operations involve:

1. Populace and resources control.

2. Dislocated population control.

3. Disaster relief.

4. Noncombatant Evacuation.

5. Civilian health care, sanitation, construction.

(3) Special Forces. Special Forces (SF) roles and missions in peace-enforcement include conducting economy of force tactical operations within the traditional SF missions of unconventional warfare (UW), foreign internal defense (FID), direct action (DA), Special Reconnaissance (SR), and counterterrorism (CT). SF missions could include:

(a) Conducting guerrilla warfare through surrogate forces against the hostile parties.

(b) Providing evasion and escape support for friendly parties behind enemy lines.

(c) Conducting subversion and sabotage.

(d) Training, advising, and supporting indigenous forces.

(e) Conducting raids, assaults, and ambushes.

(f) Conducting standoff attacks by fire from the air, ground or maritime platforms and providing terminal guidance for precision-guided munitions.

(g) Rescuing, capturing, or recovering designated personnel.

(h) Conducting reconnaissance and surveillance to obtain or verify information.

(i) Conducting attacks on the terrorist's infrastructure to recover sensitive materiel, personnel, or to decrease the terrorist's effectiveness.

(j) Conducting security assistance, antiterrorism, counterdrug and search and rescue operations.

2. Peacemaking. Peacemaking is the diplomatic process of arranging an end to disputes and solving their underlying causes.

a. **Negotiation Authority.** Because of the political nature of peacemaking, US negotiators should have written instructions that outline their limits on the various issues and explain the US' overall intent. These instructions, signed by the head of the responsible US organization or agency, e.g., US Ambassador, allow the negotiators maximum flexibility. Understanding the source of authority for all of the other negotiating parties (both friendly and opposition), helps determine the validity of an agreement and can reduce the potential for follow-on problems.

b. **Selection of US Negotiators.** The US military is not normally responsible for large-scale formal negotiations, but the possibility for these actions exists. On small-scale, e.g., hostage situations or surrender of small elements, all military members could be involved. When possible, a negotiator should be fluent in the language of all parties, be familiar with the cultures of all parties, have experience in political negotiations, and fully comprehend the total situation. Additionally, negotiators should be honest and sincere, and they should present the persona of being in control, yet open to considering other points of view.

c. **Structure of the Negotiation Facilities.** The size, shape, orientation, quality, color, and all physical aspects of the facilities can have impacts on the negotiations. Unless specifically desired, all parties should have the same size flags, banners, chairs, tables, etc., as well as the same number of translators and other support personnel in the actual negotiation chambers. Should there be more than two negotiation parties, it can be important to setup the negotiation table with an understanding of links and or conflicts between each of the parties.

d. **Number of Parties Involved in the Negotiations.** The number of parties represented in the actual negotiations should be held to the absolute minimum; however, all important factions must be represented either through direct negotiations or some form of coalition with other directly involved parties.

4. Peacekeeping Operations. If the peace enforcement action transitions to a peacekeeping operation (PKO), the JTF commander and staff will not perform functions as the PKO force because the PKO force and observers must be, and must be perceived to be, neutral - neither for nor against any of the belligerents in the conflict. However, the JTF commander and staff, as well as the theater combatant commander, should know a PKO force and observers are in the area, and they should avoid interfering with the PKO. The peacekeeping operation begins after the parties to a dispute have agreed to have a neutral party supervise a cease-fire agreement and/or separate the parties. Additionally, the PKO mandate, status of forces agreement, terms of reference, and rules of engagement are directed by the political process, not by the JTF. However, the theater combatant commander, and possibly the JTF, may be asked to assist the PKO, particularly in the areas of force protection and force evacuation. Therefore, the JTF staff should be aware of these issues. Specific, detailed information concerning PKO is contained in Joint Pub 3-07.3, (Revised Final Draft, Aug 92), Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTP) for Peacekeeping Operations.

a. **Intelligence Requirements and Security of the Peacekeeping Force.** Force protection is a high priority for a peacekeeping force. The US national contingent commander is responsible for setting and enforcing minimum standards of physical security for US forces in coordination with the peacekeeping force commander and the theater combatant commander. Critical components of the force protection program, such as rules of engagement, weapons, ammunition access, and offensive activities, may be established by the mandate for the peacekeeping force. A principal item of support is intelligence, particularly as it applies to the prevention of terrorist attacks. Due to the sensitivity of this type of support, it should be referred to as information rather than intelligence.

(1) The peacekeeping force may have little or no capability to receive external intelligence support. Therefore, intelligence collection managers must consider the ability of the peacekeeping force to receive and store intelligence materiels, the timeliness of collection systems, other national priorities, and the availability of on-the-shelf intelligence publications.
Additionally, identification of the belligerents' objectives is critical to enable the collection systems to focus the collection efforts.

(2) Instability indicators. Indications of instability related to force protection, as well as identification of voids in the collection plan, may identify potential threats to the force. Real-world data (provided through existing intelligence channels), and the Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) Instability Indicators Study, published by the Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict in June 1992, can be used to develop a threat assessment. [A copy of the LIC Instability Indicators Study is attached to this document.]

b. **Briefing personnel**

(1) Brief all personnel when they arrival, and keep them up-to-date on the following points:

(a) Status of forces agreement or legal documents.

(b) Rules of engagement.

(c) The potential threat.

(d) Closing checkpoints to prevent entry into buffer zone.

(e) How to act in foreseeable emergencies when force may be used.

(f) How to handle individuals seeking political asylum.

(2) Consider issuing a handout card to personnel which includes the ROE as well as the above points.

(3) Use of force

(a) The two principal tenets for the use of force are for self-defense only, and total impartiality. The use of force is justified only in self-defense when members of the peacekeeping operation are threatened with death or serious bodily injury.

(b) Peacekeeping forces have no mandate to prevent violations of an agreement by the active use of force. The unnecessary use of force, or illegal force, undermines the credibility and acceptability of a peacekeeping force to the host nation, the parties in conflict, and with members of the international community.

(c) Passive, or restrained, use of force employs physical means not intended to harm individuals, installations, or equipment. Examples are the use of vehicles to block the passage of persons or vehicles, and the removal of unauthorized persons from peacekeeping force positions.

(d) An intermediate option between passive force and active force may involve the use of water cannons.

(e) The active use of force employs means which result in physical harm to individuals, installations, or equipment. Examples are the use of batons, rifle butts, and weapons fire. Warn the party to halt by using (shouting) the word "halt" in the local language. If necessary, repeat the warning and cock the weapon. Fire warning shots in the air, and if the warnings are disregarded and the aggression continues, open fire using only the minimum force required to stop the advancing party. Then apply first aid or initial medical treatment to casualties and evacuate them if required. Notify headquarters immediately, obtain names of witnesses, and prepare a full written report. Only the minimum amount of active force may be used to stop a threat to life.

(f) Planning for the use of force should be influenced by the following guidelines:

_1_. Firmness. The will and ability to use force as the last resort are essential to surviving hostile threats.

_2_. Preliminary Warning. The parties in conflict should be informed of the circumstances in which peacekeepers might be obliged to use force. Warning procedures for each circumstance should be provided to the belligerent parties.

_3_. Anticipation. Analysis of information may permit a timely deployment to a threatened area before the danger becomes serious. Thoroughly plan the manner in which force will be used.

_4_. Use of force must be impartially applied. This requires close coordination with public affairs and psychological operations themes.

c. Defensive Positions and Reserve Force

(1) Defensive positions must be reconnoitered, prepared, protected, and covered by fire. Their occupation must be rehearsed. If any of the parties have nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, then appropriate protective gear should be readily available in all defensive positions.

(2) The prompt arrival of the reserve force, composed of all the national contingents, demonstrates collective determination and discourages further aggressive action.

d. **Changes in the Rules of Engagement.** Escalation of the threat, demonstrated aggression by the belligerent parties, or deteriorating conditions may require a change in the rules of engagement. Serious consideration must be given to determine the effect such changes will have. Additionally, any suggested change to the ROE must be coordinated through the chain of command.

f. **The United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in Somalia.** The UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia is known by the acronym UNOSOM.

TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES
for
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

CHAPTER III

1. Humanitarian Assistance

a. Disaster Relief. The objective of disaster relief is to provide sufficient food, water, clothing, shelter, medical care, and other life support to victims of natural and man-made disasters. To accomplish this objective, the military may be tasked to establish a secure operational environment and begin or support private volunteer organizations' (PVO) and non-govermental organizations' (NGO) supply, medical, and transportation systems.

(1) Unity of control of civilian and military agencies. The following recommendations could increase the efficiency of the HA efforts.

(a) The UN (military forces and other organizations and agencies), US DOD, other US Governmental departments, civilian relief (PVOs and NGOs) agencies, as well as foreign assistance organizations and agencies, should be under a central control and communication system for two reasons. The first is to help quicken the relief effort, the second is to minimize confusion. Civilian agencies have expertise in relief efforts around the world while the military has the assets and command and control structure to rapidly execute a course of action when required. The military's civilian counterparts in relief efforts should be involved in all planning stages so they can work as part of the team instead of as separate organizations. Joint operations require cooperation between the military and other organizations and agencies it is paramount to successful humanitarian assistance (HA) operations.

(b) Centralized command and control of very diverse organizations and agencies may not be possible in all HA operations, especially in outside the Contentinal United States (OCONUS) operations. The Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander and staff must integrate all possible organizations into the planning and execution of HA operations. This can be done by exchange of liaison officers, concentrated public affairs and information programs, coordination with existing organizations and agencies i.e., Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, UN, CARE, etc., and formation of ad hoc committees.

(2) Support and security of airfields, seaports, and rail yards are critical to successful HA operations. The following points should be addressed:

(a) Ensure the airfields, seaports, and rail yards have the necessary equipment, personnel, and control systems (automation) for off-loading aircraft, ships, and rail cars of the various types and then ensuring the cargo is rapidly sent to the required locations. Many different types, sizes, manufacturers (US and foreign), and capacities of transportation may arrive at each facility. The following types of equipment should be considered:

1. Adequate cargo trucks, tractors, and cargo trailers to transship the cargo from the primary conveyance to temporary storage sites.

2. The appropriate size and type of materiels handling equipment (MHE) to off-load the primary conveyance (aircraft, rail car, or ship) onto other transportation assets.

3. Types and quantities of petroleum, oils, and lubricants required to operate the MHE and transportation assets.

4. Repair parts for the equipment to be used. If the equipment is non-military, determine the source of supply and funding and how the military interfaces with these systems.

5. Skilled operators for the MHE and other transportation equipment.

6. Automated supply and transportation control systems that assist the facility managers to determine and record the requirements, forecast supplies due-in, plan the distribution, track the funding, and support the priorities of the central command and control system. (The Disaster Assistance Logistics Information System (DALIS) may be useful. It is a DOS-based, public-domain software, logistics inventory system intended to assist the coordination of world-wide HA operations.)

7. Adequate and appropriate tie-sowns and pallets to secure cargo throughout the transportation network. Also a method of tracking and recovering the tie-downs.

(b) Security at each airfield, seaport, and rail yard is paramount. Personnel, equipment, and disaster relief supplies must be protected. The following areas should be considered:

1. Local security to protect against pilferage, looting, vandalism, black-market activities, or other types of theft. Use of local police, militia, and other local assets should be the primary security means.

2. Protection against the effects of nature (rain, snow, dust, wind, sun, etc.), length of time stored, and perishability of the various commodities must also be consider.

Local warehouses, buildings, and other storage facilities should be used to the maximum extent possible.

3. US procured or provided construction and preservation materiels (lumber, plywood, shrink-wrap, tarpaulins, tents, etc.) and associated equipment and personnel may be required to ensure protection of HA supplies.

(3) To ensure smooth cargo movement operations in and throughout the disaster relief area, transportation node (air-land-sea), operations must be streamlined.

(a) For transportation node operations, guides and checklists should be developed to assist in determining:

1. Who - contacts for additional information and coordination, approval authorities, etc.

2. What - questions to ask requester, resources required to load and off-load, priority, origin and destination, type of shipment (break-bulk, pallet, container, etc.), special storage or security requirements, are type and quantity of tie-downs required, etc.

3. When - required delivery date, availability date, due-in to transportation node, etc.

4. Where - location of headquarters, communications, fuel, dining facilities, maintenance, medical, sleeping, security forces, translators, etc.

5. How - provide handouts that outline local transportation networks; brief descriptions of military operations and procedures for non-military personnel that must interact with the military (multi-lingual may be required), brief descriptions of non-military procedures and operations for military that must interact with non-military, etc.

(4) Identification of support requirements should be made as early as possible in HA planning and operations. The following list provides some hints:

(a) Food

1. Determine type and quantity of food required for the troops and the indigenous personnel (consideration of local cultures and religions is critical). Any specific storage requirements (refrigeration, dry storage, etc.), should also be considered.

2. Determine the quantity and stockage level to be kept in storage at all times and where it is to be stored..

3. Develop a distribution plan. This will ensure an appropriate level of supplies and how to distribute them properly. Ensure the storage and distribution area is secured.

(b) Water. Determine the quantity and the stockage level required. Secure storage facilities may be required. A distribution plan helps ensure adequate water for the troops and indigenous personnel.

(c) Shelter. Determine the type and quantity required for military and indigenous personnel. This should be based on the local climatology, estimated duration of the HA operation, security requirements, availability of facilities and construction assets, etc.

(d) Sanitation. Determine the quantity and location of required toilets (portable latrines if contractor support is available, or slit trenches with screens). Depending on the country, it may be required to locate them at different areas or educate the local populace on their use. The quantities of lime, vector control (pesticides) agents, toilet tissue, and other related supplies must be procured and provided. Particular attention should be paid to the impact on the water table and possible contamination of the water sources.

(e) Medical Support. Determine the medical support available from the local and other non-military systems, estimate the medical requirements of the military and local populace (factors - estimate of conflict casualties, disease, nature (cold, heat, water, etc.), malnutrition, etc.

(f) Transportation

1. Evaluate the road retwork. Determine road width, load bearing capacity, bridge classifications, clearance restrictions, restricted areas, washed-out ares, type of road surface, one- or two-way traffic, turn-arounds, rest areas, etc.

2. Does a railroad network exist and is it available and secure?

3. Determine airstrip availability and type; dirt, grass, paved, and the weight it will support.

4. Determine how food and supplies will be transported to needed areas, either by air or ground. If transported by air, what type of aircraft is available; C-130, C-141, C-5, helicopters, wide-body commerical or foreign assets. If by ground convoy, do adequate vehicles exist to transport supplies, and how will the convoy be protected.

(5) Supplies to accompany US military forces to the disaster relief area are outlined below.

(a) The circumstances of each disaster relief operation will dictate the days of supply required for initial deployment. The days of supply will be based on the location of the disaster area (climate, distance from supply sources, etc.), time of year (temperature, rain/snow fall, etc.), ability to obtain supplies in the disaster relief area, size of the affected population, extent of the damage to the facilities in the disaster area (electrical power, air-land-sea transportation nets, water and sewage treatment, etc., availability), and other factors. The following are recommended levels by class of supply:

1. Class I - five to seven days of MREs supplemented with "A," "B," and "T" rations when possible.

2. Classes II and IV - three to five days. The requirements for class IV to support the disaster relief operation not the internal use by military forces will be requested separately.

3. Class III - five to seven days, including aviation and package products.

4. Class V - basic load of small arms for defense, other items must be based on the situation.

5. Class VI - Planned use of sundry packs if the disaster relief operation appears to be of extended length; in short duration operations, individuals will provide their own.

6. Class VII - Deploy only with equipment required for the disaster relief operation. Based on other contingency missions (possible redeployment to locations other than home station), the remaining equipment must be prepared for movement.

7. Class VIII - Basic load supplemented with items required for the disaster relief area. Medical supplies for disaster victims will be requested separately.

8. Class IX - Basic load supplemented with appropriate additional seasonal and climate-specific items, e.g. additional filters for desert conditions.

9. Class X - Items to support the non-military portion of the operation can not be legally funded and stock-pilled using DOD funds. These items must be obtained from other sources or use approved funds from other non-DOD sources.

10. Supplies left behind - Non-DOD, NGOs, and PVOs may request that military supplies and equipment be left to foster the disaster relief recovery. Approval of JTF Headquarters and OFDA should be obtained prior to making any agreements with other agencies.

11. A MPF deploys, with 30 days of supply for their own forces.

(6) Hints for providing mortuary services to the military and civilian populations in the disaster relief area follow:

(a) US military and DOD civilian fatalities should be processed using the standard procedures of the US military services to ensure that identification of remains, notification of next-of-kin, and collection and processing of personal effects are accurately and properly accomplished.

(b) US civilian fatalities should be processed through the US Embassy with the US military providing requested support.

(c) Non-US fatalities should be processed by the local authorities. The US military can provided requested assistance but should be very careful to understand any special handling procedures required by local culture, custom, or religion.

(d) Disasters that inflict heavy loss of life in an area may require the military to rapidly collect and temporarily inter all types of fatalities for health and sanitation reasons. Great care should be given to identifing remains; collecting, inventoring, and storing personal effects; accurately marking temporary graves; and providing information to local authorities.

(7) Hints for providing personnel service support to military members in disaster relief area follow:.

(a) Respective Services should provide basic personnel services for their members. When a JTF is formed the JTF Headquarters should provide consolidated personnel service support for all assigned and attached personnel.

(b) Many reserve component (RC) personnel may be involved (they may or may not be assigned or attached to a JTF) in disaster relief operations. Provision of military clothing and equipment, pay, postal services, awards and courts martial, performance evaluation reports, inclusion in military personnel accounting systems, etc. should be covered in basic plans and standard operating procedures (SOPs) for all units with the potential mission to support disaster relief operations.

(c) Other military and civilian (foreign and domestic) embassy, contractors, visitors, data collectors, advisors, support personnel, etc., may also require some form of logistical and personnel support from the controlling military headquarters. Procedures for determining authority to issue and return, accountability, payment, and projection of requirements should be covered in unit SOPs.

(8) Disaster relief operations require rapid response by all supporting assets. The military will base its urgency on the type of disaster, extent of damage, relievable suffering, security of the area, abilities of the local authorities and agencies, NGOs, and PVOs. The following areas should be considered:

(a) In all disaster relief cases the military should react to protect life and property as rapidly as the situation will permit. The military can react rapidly to a small disaster close to home station that does not require increased security, deployment, activation of RC, etc. Larger disasters that require deployment, activation of RC, formulation of new headquarters, increased security, etc., should be based on the military commander's assessment and the potential overriding political situations.

(b) The military should also be concerned with the speed of their redeployment of combat and logistical forces. The military's primary mission is still to protect the US national interest by use of military force and when directed by the NCA and Congress, defeat enemies anywhere in the world. Military commanders must therefore retain the combat readiness of their units as their primary focus, and disaster relief as an ancillary mission.

(9) Military engineers can provide support to disaster relief victims and participating military forces. The following points highlight the types of support:

(a) Construction support for military forces should be very limited. Use of field standards and existing facilities should be normal operations.

(b) New construction and repair of civil facilities should be controlled by the senior military headquarters in coordination with the OFDA (OCONUS) or the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) (CONUS). Military engineers should be used for the following types of missions:

1 Clearing rubble and debris to reestablish transportation networks.

2. Repair of water and sewage treatment facilities.

3. Repair of electrical production and distribution systems. The provision of prime power is also a valid mission.

4. Establishment of life support areas for disaster victims e.g. tent cities.

5. Establishment of temporary storage and distribution centers.

(c) The use of military engineers for repair or construction of private civil facilities (houses, businesses, or other structures), should not be done with prior approval by controlling military and civil headquarters.

(d) Disaster relief operations in areas with actual or potential threats also require the use of engineer assets as well as other non-engineer military units to clear and mark lanes through minefields, clear roads and trails of mines, and conduct other countermine operations.

(10) Appropriate contract support can streamline HA operations. All disaster relief operations require the support of contracting officers that have the expertise in rapidly issuing local contracts and with the approval authority for funding limits that support the disaster relief efforts. Whenever possible, contractors should be used to support disaster relief. This helps reestablish the local economy, allows the military to disengage, and in most cases does not commit DOD funds.

b. **Health Service Support.** Maximum use of organic assets of the forces employed should be made. Continual tailoring, or even reinforcement of organic assets, should be flexible in order to meet changing conditions during operation.

(1) The medical operations and programs may be integral in HA operations. Medical operations may encompass all military medical actions taken or programs established to further US national goals, objectives, and missions. A mission is developed in accordance with principles of international and domestic law. Medical operations can play a significant and proactive role in enhancing:

(a) The development of the host nation (HN) military medical infrastructure.

(b) Providing and maintaining the basic necessities of life for the general population through HN civilian medical programs, if available, or UN-sanctioned relief programs and systems.

(c) Providing assistance to repair, improve, or establish basic services once hostilities have ceased.

(2) Mission integrity includes unity of effort, adaptability, and legitimacy. Unity of effort must occur with other governmental agencies to avoid duplication and wasting

resources. Adaptability allows for the skill and willingness to change or modify structures or methods to ensure success of the mission. There must be a willingness and an acceptance of the right of a government to govern or for a group or agency to make and enforce decisions. The local population must perceive that authority is legitimate, effective, and that it uses proper agencies for reasonable purposes.

(a) When a decision is made by the appropriate political authority for the US to support a UN sponsored HA operation the US may engage all instruments of national power to conduct that operation.

(b) US participation in an HA operation is based on analysis of the mandate and the situation. The development of the terms of reference (TOR) governs the implementation of US participation. The TOR describes the mission, command relationships, organization, logistics, accounting procedures, coordination and liaison, and responsibilities of US military units and personnel assigned or detailed to the mission.

(3) Humanitarian and Civil Assistance. HA and civil assistance projects or activities in any foreign country requires prior approval of the DOS. The assistance compliments, not duplicates, any other social or economic assistance being provided by other US departments or agencies or by worldwide relief agencies. HA is a mechanism through which US Armed Forces personnel and assets assist a host nation to improve the quality of life through rudimentary construction, health care and sanitation programs. These operations assist in achieving short-term and localized support for a US presence, and provide assistance to the civilian population of the host nation.

(4) HA Requirements. Health Service Support (HSS) assistance may be carried out only in conjunction with authorized military operations and limited to medical, dental, land veterinary care provided in a country's rural, coastal, or outlying island areas.

(a) The HSS aspect of HA should be planned before deployment. It is, at the very least, an element in a contingency plan that must be blueprinted for.

(b) Even if HA missions are not included in mandates; and even if a host government, forbids US forces from providing aid to its citizens, the peacekeeping force is justified in providing HA in a buffer zone between two belligerents, based on humanitarian grounds. The force commander will make additional resources available as required. The HA tasks may include:

1. Investigating reports of missing persons.

2. Providing emergency medical treatment and medical assistance programs for the prevention of disease.

3. Resupplying minority communities separated from their compatriots by a buffer zone.

4. Transferring minority populations when requested by the minority population itself, or as required for the security of this population group, or for imperative military reasons.

5. Providing goodwill, e.g., organizing meetings between members of a minority community with relatives on the other side of the buffer zone; handing over letters, parcels, etc.

6. Repatriating prisoners of war, human remains, mail, or property. While methods may vary from force to force, the essentials for a hand over procedure must include the following:

a. An intermediary, acceptable to both sides and with independently established communications, negotiates the handover. In some cases, the force itself may provide the channel, using its staff or the liaison officers from the two parties. In other cases, an independent body such as the International Committee of the Red Cross which has representatives in most capitals, may be more acceptable to the parties concerned.

b. An organization must be established to enable the intermediary to effect a hand over. As a minimum, it should include:

(1) A supervisory element to coordinate with the intermediary and confirm exactly who, or what, is to be handed over and the procedure to be used. It will ensure the required personnel and resources are available.

(2) The sector commander through whose area of responsibility the exchange is to be made will be responsible for providing escort for the prisoner of war exchange; the security of the area; and communications between the supervisory element, United Nations Military Observers, and the checkpoints on either side of the buffer zone.

(3) The force headquarters will make additional resources available as required. The resources may include extra transport, medical cover (including ambulances), military police for traffic control, or additional communications equipment.

c. A procedure must be established to properly handle each type of handover.

d. The relationship between the peacekeeping force and its neighboring communities must be cultivated to ensure an atmosphere of cooperation. The force may be dependent upon host country local nationals to support the laundry and dining facilities, and for electricity, sanitation, and other services, if they exist within the AO.

(5) Health Services Support Organizations

(a) It is not enough to tailor the HSS organization to meet mission requirements. The HSS structure must be tailored from existing resources. The HSS package for an HA operation is limited by the scope of its mission. Preventive medicine measures must be employed to minimize the medical threat. The disease and non-battle injury (DNBI) rate is more significant on these operations than are combat wounds. Stress factors in HA operations may cause stress disorders in the force. These disorders include misconduct which may threaten the success of the HA operation. Employment of effective training and expertise of mental health and stress control personnel can help prevent or manage these complications.

1. The HSS support package for HA is specifically tailored (to include use of hospital ships) to meet the needs of, and be compatible with, the size of the supported force. For successful HSS operations, the HSS planner must ensure that:

a. The size and composition of the HSS element is sufficient to provide adequate care. This may include consideration of the organizational structure and individual training of selected HSS units.

(1) Medical sets, kits, and outfits of many hospitalization units have generally been constructed to support anticipated combat-based treatment requirements.

(2) Flexibility in developing personnel tables of these units to fit the needs of the force. Analysis of the Commander's plan, the medical threat, and the scope of the HA operation.

(3) Capability to supply the HA mission with regard to selected class VIII supplies, medical equipment, and personnel to meet mission needs.

(4) Logistical links of resupply of class VIII supplies, pharmaceutical, blood products, and medical gases must be well-defined.

(5) Medical evacuation means and routes are planned for and coordinated with other Services and allied nations.

(6) Veterinary support is sufficient for surveillance of food stuffs and care of government owned animals.

(7) A mass casualty plan is prepared and provision is made for practicing the plan.

(8) Alternate sources of HSS are considered, and if appropriate, incorporated into the plan. These alternate sources may include, but are not limited to:

(a) Diplomatic flights for medical evacuation and resupply.

(b) Embassy and HN physicians, if available.

(c) Allied nations' capabilities for emergency care, hospitalization, and ancillary services support.

(9) If hospitalization support is not available within the immediate area, plans must be coordinated with the units providing this support. In light of the potential terrorist threat in HA, it is imperative hospitalization support (location, characteristics, laboratory, blood supply, and capacity), be available in the event of a mass casualty situation.

(10) Contingency plans are prepared for HSS in the event of a withdrawal of the HA force or escalation of hostilities.

(11) Base development, construction, and real estate requirements necessary for the deployment and employment of the HSS force have been identified to the force command authority.

(12) Plans must include requirements for basic personal protective measures, immunizations, chemoprophylaxis, immunoprophylaxis, insect control, and other appropriate measures.

(6) Medical Threat Information can be obtained from the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC), Fort Detrick, Frederick, Maryland, 21701-5004.

(a) AFMIC is a Joint agency of the Military Departments. Its products include:

1. Medical capabilities Studies which are prepared on most countries.

2. Disease Occurrence Worldwide is prepared monthly.

3. Scientific and technical intelligence products are prepared on military significant diseases throughout the world.

4. The Weekly Wire is an electronic message that transmits current medical intelligence items of interest to the medical planner.

5. The Medical Facilities Handbook is a four-volume reference set on hospital facilities within major geographical areas worldwide.

(b) AFMIC can:

1. Respond to time-sensitive quick reaction intelligence production requests from the user community.

2. Respond to crisis situations to support military medical operations.

3. Support by direct contact with the Center.

c. **Preventive Medicine**. Preventive Medicine support is generally under strict constraints. It is essential that a complete analysis of the medical threat be prepared. Pre-deployment training on field sanitation and personal hygiene measures, as well as command emphasis on preventive medicine, is necessary.

(1) Environmental Disease. Field hygiene and sanitation as well as other preventive medicine issues impact on the health of US Forces employed in HA operations. Debilitating injury can be caused by disease, non-battle and environmental injuries:

(a) Foodborne and Waterborne Diseases.

(b) Heat-related environmental injury.

(c) Contact with the local population (AIDS, VD, etc.)

(2) Stress Control and Mental Health Service in HA operations must be considered in order to maintain unit effectiveness.

(3) Veterinary support in HA operations is required to ensure that procured food is safe, and working dogs are healthy. Veterinary services can contribute to the success of the mission by improving the local population's health through programs such as immunizations for zoonotic animal diseases, public health and

sanitation training; and training in food hygiene, safety, and inspection techniques.

d. Understanding the Supported Culture. Understanding the supported culture is a major contributor to long and short term success of the HA mission.

(1) Military Sources of Information. The CA and SOF area assessments are good sources of information on a culture. A basic assessment is usually available on every country in the world from the supporting CA/PSYOP or SF commands. This assessment should be used to gain a fundamental understanding of the targeted country. Classified information in the assessment should be removed to allow the widest dissemination of the information. (example: FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations, Appendix F)

(2) Method of Dissemination of Information. Commanders and staffs should read the complete assessments and updates to the assessments when they become available. Information should be extracted for presentation to all units. All personnel in an HA operation have an absolute need for cultural information--the personnel at the lowest levels are usually the least likely to get the information but the most likely to have daily contact with the indigenous population.

(3) Mistakes in dealing with the indigenous population are most commonly made by the lowest level of personnel participating in the HA operation. These mistakes are also most likely to affect the indigenous population's impression of the operation and the participating countries. It is essential that all personnel are given cultural instruction and that cultural rules of engagement are established and enforced.

(4) Important information on a culture are:

(a) Unlike the western world, religion shapes a person and culture more than any other factor. It is essential that HA personnel not only understand the indigenous population's religion(s) but also understand how that religion affects daily behavior. A list of dos and don'ts is a good way to teach this information. The religion of Islam is the one that most affects cultural behavior in an extreme manner and is easiest to offend.

(b) The physical dimensions and environment of the country are important to create a mental frame of reference. Instruction should cover the boundaries of the country and the major cities, rivers, mountains, roads, weather, terrain, and administrative sub-divisions.

(c) The history of the country with an emphasis on recent history is important to understand how a country came to need HA and gives significant clues on how to return the country to a self-sufficient state. Biographies of the most prominent persons of the country should be assembled.

(d) Understanding the indigenous social structure helps HA personnel plan how to work and communicate with the population effectively and without offense.

(e) Existing public administrative structures may be used to channel HA efforts and takeover the functions when the HA mission ends.

(f) Local language proficiency is an important skill HA personnel can possess to make the mission a success. Every person in the HA force should at least know certain key words, such as: hello, good-by, yes, no, go, come, help, stop, today, tomorrow, what's your name, my name is, like (?), where, what, etc.. Language classes should be given to all personnel. Classes could be of 3, 6, and 30 days duration and should be ongoing throughout the mission. As more HA personnel gain a basic language capability, a marked improvement in the effectiveness of the HA mission will become apparent. People appreciate the efforts by others to learn their language and make an extra effort to understand what message is trying to be conveyed. The ability to communicate is the single most important skill in making the HA mission effective.

e. Special Operations Forces (SOF) Roles and Missions. This section is based primarly on USA units.

(1) SOF are suited to perform HA missions due to their unique organization, training, doctrine, and experience. They can efficiently and effectively execute HA missions once the initial security of the area is achieved.

(a) SOF are organized in a manner that allows them to easily execute the full-range of tasks required in HA and to conduct HA missions of any size.

1. SOF consists of Civil Affairs (CA) units, Psychological Operations (PSYOP) units, Special Forces (SF) units, Ranger units, and SOF aviation (SOA) units.

2. SOF units operate in packages of teams, companies, battalions, and groups that have medical, engineer, communications, security, planning, CA, and PSYOP capabilities.

3. SOF personnel have extensive HA training and many have recent HA experience. Most have extensive experience in operating with indigenous peoples.

(b) SOF train for HA missions and regularly conduct OCONUS HA training and actual HA missions.

1. SOF employs economy of force to maximize their effect by recruitment, training, or utilization of large numbers of indigenous personnel and indigenous organizations.

2. SOF personnel and units are trained to work within indigenous cultures utilizing language expertise or interpreters. They are extensively trained to be culturally sensitive and are knowledgeable of cultural taboos.

3. SOF are trained and regularly conduct operations in OCONUS areas of extreme environmental conditions and with austere logistics support.

(c) SOF doctrine is applicable to HA missions.

1. Foreign Internal Defense (FID) and Unconventional Warfare (UW) doctrine is applicable to HA missions. SOF units tasked to run HA missions plan and conduct operations using the same techniques used to organize indigenous personnel for operations. CA and PSYOP capabilities are used in the same manner as in military operations short of war. SOF units would train and organize the indigenous population to assist them in constructing sanitation facilities, control of water and food supplies, crowd control, and in the building of systems that would carry on the HA work after all US personnel have departed.

(2) SOF forces conduct HA missions in the following manner.

(a) When the CINC is ordered to conduct a HA mission, a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) headquarters is established near the JTF HQ. Liaison is established between the headquarters and planning begins.

(b) The JSOTF normally plans a multi-lateral phased operation. The plan contains extensive CA and PSYOP plans that begin execution prior to entry into the area of operations.

(c) SOF teams enter the country with the security forces and conduct in-depth assessments of the chosen sites.

(d) SOF companies augmented with CA and PSYOP enter the country and move to the sites to organize the construction or development of facilities, manage the influx of operational and relief supplies, and develop systems to control the distribution of relief. A key aspect of this phase is the involvement of indigenous personnel and relief agencies in all areas of the development of the site.

(e) SOF continues to develop the sites while training and recruiting indigenous personnel to conduct the mission. Gradually civilian agencies and indigenous personnel/agencies take-over the HA relief effort.

(f) SOF conducts hand-off operations and leaves the country.

(3) SF concerns in HA operations include:

(a) SF units and individuals not being used or being misused during an HA operation.

1. Organization. USA SOF units operate in packages of teams, companies, battalions, or groups that have extensive medical, engineer, communications, weapons and planning capabilities. This combination of skills covers a significant part of the range of tasks found in an HA environment. All SF personnel are highly trained in their particular skill and are usually trained in two skills and cross-trained in all skills found in an SF unit. (All SF personnel are officers or NCOs)

2. Training. SF units employ economy of force to maximize their effect by the recruitment, training, or utilization of large numbers of indigenous personnel or indigenous organizations (SF personnel and units are primarily trained to work within indigenous cultures utilizing language expertise or interpreters.) They are extensively trained to be culturally sensitive and are knowledgeable of cultural taboos.

3. Doctrine. SF doctrine trains SF personnel extensively in the conduct of operations outside the US working with indigenous personnel exclusively. FID and UW doctrine fit well into HA missions. SF units tasked to organize HA operations plan and conduct operations using the same techniques that would be utilized to organize Guerrillas for combat operations. SF units would train and organize the indigenous personnel to construct sanitary facilities, control water supplies, control their own people to ensure fair food and water distribution.

a. Based on SF organization, training, and doctrine use them to:

(1) Assist in the development and management of HA sites.

(2) Liaison, organize and manage indigenous personnel and refugees.

(3) Conduct HA medical missions.

(b) SF medics will be under-utilized. SF medics are able to support the medical needs of refugees. SF medics receive a vast and broad medical education ranging from the typical emergency medical and battle trauma treatments to the conduct of veterinary medical operations. They are trained to work with indigenous populations, in austere environments and with limited logistical support. In addition to medical knowledge they are extensively trained to conduct military operations, provide for their own security and train and lead foreign military forces. Use SF medics in HA medical treatment or preventative medicine activities.

(c) Indigenous personnel will not be utilized. Indigenous personnel utilization is necessary to accomplish HA missions. Conventional forces often look on indigenous personnel as threats to their forces rather than a source of manpower. Indigenous personnel can assist in providing information, security, distribution of food and water and dissemination of information. Use SF personnel along with CA personnel to recruit, organize, and manage indigenous personnel.

(4) Civil Affairs (CA) Roles and Mission.

(a) CA command conducts planning in coordination with the JTF prior to deployment. A CA command should deploy with the JTF and establish a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) in conjunction with the PSYOP command. CA battalions should move to relief sites and begin operations.

(b) Basic CA activities are to:

1. Accompany elements of US ground forces in order to minimize impact of operations of tactical units on noncombatants.

2. Support civil and/or military officials with development and implementation of relief programs.

3. Recommend appropriate actions to commanders to secure and maintain positive civil-military relationships.

4. Conduct coordination between US forces commander and other civilian and military agencies to maintain concerted relief action.

5. Perform research of area and indigenous population.

6. Provide commander with area assessments to include population, economic, cultural.

7. Advise and prepare estimates on use of CA asset for relief operations.

8. Provide training to US forces on local area and population and on the implementation of relief efforts.

9. Coordinate requirements for local labor support.

10. Take into custody all arms, ammunition, implements of war, and contraband items.

11. Determine type and amount of relief supplies. Plan and coordinate use of relief supplies. Establish and supervise relief distribution centers.

12. Plan and supervise rationing system.

13. Identify public and private facilities available for use by military forces.

14. Prepare map and list of significant cultural properties. Assist in the protecting of these properties.

15. Advise, supervise, and operate civil information agencies.

16. Supervise the conduct and movement of dislocated civilians.

(5) CA concerns in HA operations

(a) CA and PSYOP overall plans must be formulated at the JTF level prior to the beginning of the HA operation. Without a general plan, every contingency will be met with a reactive operation that never allows time for a comprehensive CA effort. The general CA plan should prioritize actions for contingencies with staged implementation and supervised execution. The JTF staff should conduct contingency planning and push for approval of the plans. CA planning personnel should focus efforts on anticipated and critical events, then add detail and less critical issues as time permits.

(b) CMOC should not be collocated with the JTF HQs and staff sections and representatives from each organization should not be present on each other's staff. CA should be located near the JTF in order to influence the operational plan and give daily advice. JTF planners should be aware that an HA operation is more CA and PSYOP than military in nature and not a tactical situation. If CA input and guidance is not considered, the HA operation may fail. At JTF levels, CA cells should be included in all staff sections to provide input and expertise. The JTF operations and logistics sections should have representatives in the CMOC.

(c) CA units will not be committed until well into the operation. The HA operation will be less successful if CA units and personnel are not included in the initial planning, deployed with the initial forces, and participate with the initial execution of operations. CA should take part with all JTF operations from the very beginning.

(d) Without adequate higher headquarters, CA assets may be misused. The JTF and CMOC need sufficient personnel from the start of the HA operation to establish and fully staff the HA operation throughout its execution.

(e) CA assets and planning should have one chain of command. CA execution will be confused if the JTF operations and logistics staffs each exercise a different task organization for command and control of CA assets. The CA commander and CMOC should ensure that this issue is resolved.

(f) A lack of a CA planner early in the planning stages of an HA operation could lead to misusing CA assets. CA forces can be used in a general support mode or in a dedicated mode. The general support mode is the more effective of the two methods because it allows a flexible response.

(g) CA force structure committed to an HA mission will be sub-optimal. A CA company contains personnel not trained or needed for an HA operation. The HA operation requires specialized skills which only a small part of the personnel in a CA company possess. The HA CA skills needed are principally advisors and coordinators who serve as force multipliers. Deploy CA companies with augmentation of selected CA personnel trained in HA operations.

(h) CA units and personnel have inadequate communications between CA elements and their controlling headquarters as well as between CA elements and civilian agencies. Developing a comprehensive plan of communications and augmenting the CA elements with communications are essential for effective use of CA assets.

(i) CA and all other units fail to adequately utilize interpreters. CA units, like almost every other unit will lack an adequate language capability and will have to use interpreters. Initially most personnel will be unable to effectively utilize interpreters. Unit training or orientation on the proper use of interpreters should be given when and where necessary.

(j) CA and other units need language capability. A basic knowledge of the language is necessary to begin the process of expanded comprehensive communication with the indigenous people. An effort to learn and speak the language pays enormous dividends of support from the local people and add significantly to the overall success of the HA operation.

Courses should be set-up in theater to teach a 3-day, 7-day, or 30-day quick language course. All personnel should take the 3-day course and those with ability or special need should graduate to the longer courses. Language ability is the single most important factor to long term success of an HA mission.

(k) CA elements must be more than one man. One man CA elements are ineffective because of the need for security and the accomplishment of many tasks that required one person to stay with the supported units or indigenous personnel and the other to go and coordinate; therefore, all CA elements should be at least a two-person team.

(l) CA medical care should not greatly exceed the care provided by indigenous sources. The CA medical care effort should be used to build-up the local medical facilities. Every effort should be made to provide HA medical care and to train local medical personnel.

(6) Psychological Operations Forces (PSYOP) Roles and Missions. USA PSYOP units consist of tactical companies that contain a Light Print Section, Product Development Section, Audiovisual Section, and three Tactical Dissemination Platoons. The platoons contain three Loudspeaker Teams. Each PSYOP battalion contains an Operational Support Company and Four Tactical Companies. The PSYOP group contains five PSYOP battalions.

(a) PSYOP method of operation in HA: PSYOP Group is notified and begins planning and coordination with the JTF staff. A PSYOP plan is made after input is received from the SF assessment team. The Group deploys and establishes a headquarters at the CMOC near the JTF headquarters. A PSYOP Product Development Company is established as far forward as possible. A PSYOP development battalion is deployed along with a loudspeaker battalion and a dissemination battalion.

(b) Basic PSYOP missions are:

1. Establishment and management of television and radio stations (AM & FM).

2. Production of videos.

3. Production of leaflets.

4. Research of all aspects of area and population.

5. Loudspeaker teams.

(7) Psychological Operations Concerns

(a) The JTF command and all levels of subordinate commands should realize that PSYOP operations are critical to the success of HA operations. PSYOP units during operation Provide Comfort developed products that provided information on the processes and organization of the relief camp, how to eat and use the meals-ready-to-eat, and how to mix baby food. Loud speaker teams were found to be the best method to control crowds and to keep peace in the towns. Videos were made to assist illiterate refugees. Airborne loudspeakers were used to inform population groups that were located far from the camps of their existence and where to go for help. Include PSYOP in the planning and ensure that the complete chain of command understands what PSYOP can offer.

(b) PSYOP units or activities should deploy with the first security units to communicate the security force's intent to the indigenous population. PSYOP units can provide, through interpreters, the critical first link that assures the population of the HA intent of the operation. Include PSYOP in the initial deployment with the mission of informing the population of the HA intent.

(c) PSYOP efforts will be less effective because of improper headquarters location. To be effective, the PSYOP command must be collocated with the CMOC instead of attached to the MPs or JTF J-3. The CA and PSYOP efforts are complimentary and most effective when executed in coordination with each other.

(d) Location of the PSYOP Product Development Center (PDC) is important to its effectiveness. The distance between the PDC and the supported PSYOP and CA units must be minimal to allow expeditious delivery and request for products.

(e) Loudspeaker teams and points are extremely important to communications at a site. The loudspeaker points become a communications focal point within a distribution or refugee site. Personnel naturally assemble there to pass on information or designate the point as a meeting place. Carefully locate the loudspeaker point in a central location and centralize information for distribution at that site.

(f) PSYOP units need to deploy with organic transportation in order to effectively perform their mission. They cannot rely on the supported unit.

f. Interagency Support and Control.

(1) Identify and contact other participating agencies and organizations. Understanding their missions, objectives, and tasks enables the HA operation to operate more efficiently.

(a) Identify and obtain the mission, objectives, and tasks of all participants.

(b) Identify on-the scene individuals to provide an estimate of the situation so rapid adjustments to mission and tasks can accomplished as needed.

(c) Exchange LNOs capable of effecting mission and task changes.

(d) Provide clear communications throughout the chain of command, to include non-military organizations, to clarify issues and present a balanced interagency view.

(2) US Diplomatic Mission and Country Team. The US diplomatic mission to a host nation includes representatives of all US departments and agencies physically present in the country. The chief of the diplomatic mission, normally an Ambassador, provides direction and control over all US in-country government personnel. This authority does not extend to personnel in other missions or those assigned to either an international agency or to a combatant commander. A crisis may arise where the US has no diplomatic mission. In this situation the President may send a representative with instructions that vary from the standard authorities and responsibilities of a chief of mission. Identify the authorities and responsibilities of the Chief of American Diplomatic Mission or Presidential Envoy. A copy of the Presidential Appointment is normally provided to the Combatant Commander, if not, contact the Department of State, Regional Bureau Chief for the country involved or the Political Advisor to the Combatant Commander. For specific organizations, names, addresses, and phone numbers refer to Appendix B.

(3) Task Force Somalia. Task Force Somalia is a joint office of DOS and USAID representatives. Their purpose is to serve as the focal point for Operation Restore Hope. For specific organizations, names, addresses, and phone numbers refer to Appendix B.

(4) United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). UNHCR has a major role in coordinating aid to refugees, returnees, and displace persons. Except in special circumstances, its material assistance activities are conducted through national or local authorities of the country concerned, other organizations of the UN system, non-governmental organizations, or private technical agencies. Coordination with the UNHCR is critical for any humanitarian relief effort. Establish close working relationship immediately upon notification of a mission with UNHCR, close coordination is absolutely essential for successful operations. Failure to coordinate before and during the operation may preclude the UNHCR from accepting transfer of equipment, supplies, and facilities as the military disengages. Obtain a copy of the UNHCR text that outlines specifications for refugee camp construction. For specific organizations, names, addresses, and phone numbers refer to Appendix B.

(5) Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART). OFDA is responsible for the formation of the DART. It is important to realize that USAID/Bureau for Food and Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) funds or food may not be committed for any purpose without written approval from DART team leader or FHA Washington. Relationship of the DART with the Joint Task Force can be improved by ascertaining the responsibilities and rank of the senior members of the DART and provide the information to the military command with similar responsibilities and rank of the JTF provided to the DART. DART missions and tasks are:

(a) The DART/Mogadishu will serve the following function:

(b) Advise Ambassador Oakley and General Johnston on issues related to humanitarian relief.

(c) Advise US Military (civil affairs, medical, transport, and engineering units) on appropriate military relief and rehabilitation projects.

(d) Staff joint operations center along with civil affairs, United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and other non-governmental organizations.

(e) Assist in coordinating US military activities with NGO's, ICRC, and UN agencies.

(f) Fund relief and rehabilitation projects through the NGO's, the UN, and ICRC.

(g) Address/Telephone Number: There are currently three DART teams in the area, two in Kenya and one in Somalia. The DART can be reached through the respective addresses. For specific organizations, names, addresses, and phone numbers refer to Appendix B.

(6) The ICRC has maintained a food relief program in Somalia for several years. The size of the Somali operation has led ICRC to establish a system of sponsoring other PVO and NGOs. The ICRC also maintains a medical staff in-country, provides tracing services to locate missing persons and deliver messages, and visits people detained in Mogadishu. ICRC do not hold formal meetings with other NGO and PVOs but do coordinate frequently at the worker level. Numerous legal consideration limit, and in some cases restrict, the direct coordination between the ICRC and the Joint Task Force Commander with respect to displaced civilians, detainees, and EPWs. The classification of personnel and the flow of information must be clarified through legal channels. For specific organizations, names, addresses, and phone numbers refer to Appendix B.

(7) Other Relief Organizations. Relief organization in Southern Somalia, by location, with brief description of their activities (as of 6 Dec 92).

Mogadishu

World Food Program (WFP): ships and airlifts food

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC): 276 general feeding kitchens (580,000 beneficiaries), 1 surgical hospital (Mogadishu north), 15 health posts, flying surgical team, medical supplies

United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF): support to maternal-child health (MCH) supplementary feeding centers, health posts, rehabilitation of wells, EPI/immunization (type of medical program), medical supplies and supplementary foods to NGOs

Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere (CARE): general distributions, port/airport discharge of food

Medicins Sans Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders) France (MSF/F): medical supplies to hospitals and clinics

International Medical Corps (IMC): 1 hospital, surgical team (Mogadishu south)

Save the Children/United Kingdom (SCF/UK): supplementary feeding centers (4 operating), 10 therapeutic feeding centers in 4 wards of hospitals, primary health care training, water in camps

Irish Concern: 1 supplementary feeding center, school, Oral Rehydration Solution (ORS) center

Cooperaztione Internationale (CISP): 6 MCH clinics (Mogadishu north) and supplementary feeding centers

Action Internationale Contre la Faim (AICF): 4 supplementary feeding centers, 2 therapeutic feeding centers (1 Mogadishi north, 1 Mogadishu south), water

SOS International: 1 hospital (Pediatric) (Mogadishu south), 1 orphanage

United Nations Development Program (UNDP): Rehabilitate Mogadishu water supply, garbage collection

World Concern: 9 supplementary feeding centers, 3 MCH clinics

SAS (local NGO working with UNDP): garbage collection

Italian Medical Team: hospital (Mogadisu north)

SWEDRELIEF: 24 supplementary feeding centers in camps (20,000 children).

Baidoa

WFP: airlifts food, overseas distribution and airdrops

UNICEF: provides supplies, foods, and medical supplies to NGOs, rehabilitation of wells

ICRC: 20 general feeding kitchens (reaches 36,000)

CARE: general food distributions, health care, seed distribution, 5 supplementary feeding centers (4 additional in surrounding villages), water supply

IMC: 1 hospital, surgical team

Irish Concern: 5 supplementary feeding centers, 2 therapeutic feeding centers

SCF/UK: water supply

OXFAM: water supply

World Vision Relief and Development (WVRD): supplementary feeding, agricultural packs

MSF/Holland: feeding centers, medical (not yet operational)

GOAL: orphanage, supplementary feeding, seed distribution

Catholic Relief Services (CRS): general food distribution in 8 outlying villages (100,000 beneficiaries)

Belt Weyne: Kiran Region

ICRC: 2 health posts, supplementary feeding, 23 general feeding kitchens

IMC: 1 hospital (18 bed pediatrics), medical outreach

SCF/UK: Therapeutic feeding, 4 supplementary feeding centers, water

Kismaiyo: Lower Juba Region

WFP: receives food from port

UNICEF: 2 MCH/supplemental feeding centers, wells improvement, sanitation, supports 2 orphanages (900 children),out-patient clinics and dispensaries, basic health care in DP camps

MSF/Belgium: 1 hospital, 6 supplemental feeding centers

World Concern: 3 MCH centers (in Jelib), 5 supplemental feeding centers

OXFAM: seed/tool (rural areas - 11,000 families in Lower Juba Valley - Joint program with UNICEF, supplemental. feeding

ICRC: 54 general feeding kitchens (95,000 beneficiaries)

Meroa: Lower Shebelle Region

ICRC: Food barges, 24 general feeding kitchens (43,200 beneficiaries)

MSF/F: 17 supplumental feeding centers (14,191 children beneficiaries), water/sanitation, 3 ORS centers

OXFAM: seed program (rural areas - see Kismaiyo)

ANNALINA: feeding centers, TB patient care

GOAL: supplementary feed centers, health/medical, tuberculosis care

Brava: Lower Shebelle

ICRC: 3 general feeding kitchens (5,400 bneficiaries)

MSF/F: supplementary feeding (rural areas), water/sanitation

OXFAM: seeds/tools, rural areas (see Kismaiyo)

ANNALINA: feeding centers, TB patient care

Bardera: Gedo Region

WFP: airlifts food, supervises general distributions

UNICEF: drug supply to hospital, 4 supplementary feeding centers, provision of supplementary foods to NGOs, immunization (EPI)

CARE: general distributions, 1 general feeding kitchen, 1 outpatient clinic, seeds/tools

AICF: therapeutic feeding, water (not yet operational)

ICRC: vitamin A, measels vaccination, refuse control, ORS, latrine construction, mobile clinic. Planned: vector control, community health worker (CHW) training

SWEDRELIEF: latrine construction

Hoddur: Bakool Region

WFP: Airlifts food

Irish Concern: general feeding kitchens, dry ration distribution

MSF/F: 5 supplementary feeding centers, immunizations (measles), water

UNICEF: supply of vaccines for expanded program of immunizations (EPI)

ICRC: 5 general feeding kitchens

Afgoi: Lower Shebelle

ICRC: general feeding kitchens

Irish Concern: 2 supplementary feeding centers, school, health facility

SCF/UK: agriculture

Saco Uen: Middle Juba

World Concern: supplementary feeding

Swedish Church Relief: services unknown

Uanle Uen: Lower Shebelle

Irish Concern: 2 supplementary feeding centers

Gelib: Middle Juba

World Concern: supplementary feeding (see Kismaiyo)

MSF/B: feeding centers

ICRC: 8 general feeding kitchens (14,400 beneficiaries)

Quorioley: Lower Shebelle

ICRC: 17 general feeding kitchens (30,600 beneficiaries)

SCF/United States (US): agricultural rehabilitation, training of CHW, monetization area coordinator (not yet operational)

MSF/F: outpatient clinic/dispensary, 4 feeding centers

ACCORD: Services unknown

OXFAM: Agricultural rehabilitation

Jalalaqsi: Hiran Region

SCF/UK: therapeutic feeding, water survey (in town and rural) (actions not operational yet)

ICRC: 17 general feeding kitchens (30,600 beneficiaries)

Wajit: Bakoi Region

MSF/UK: 3 feeding centers (2,500 children beneficiaries), immunizations (measles), water

CONCERN: dry ration distributions in town and area (50 villages)

Jamaame: near Kismaiyo

ICRC: 8 general feeding kitchens (14,400 beneficiaries)

UNICEF: 1 supplementary feeding center, 1 MCH/outpatient dispensary

Jowhar: Middle Shebelle Region

ICRC: 21 kitchens in town, 69 in village, 2 out-patient departments (OPDs)

MSF/Sweden: health, water, medical (proposed)

Aden Yabal Middle Shebelle

MSF/S: health, water, medical (proposed)

Crossborder in NE Kenya/Somalia, Gedo Region

UNHCR: From Mandera: repatriated 2,800 refugees, another 7,500 refuges ready to return to region. From El Wak: repatriated 2,591 refugees, 6,000 could potentially return to the region once secured. Provide tarps, blankets, jerry cans and month's food ration

CRS: Crossborder food operation - operation being taken over from ICRC in Mandera and El Wak, El Wak: 500 metric tons per month

ICRC: Crossborder food movement from Liboi - 1,000 metric tons per month

International Rescue Committee (IRC): Health, livestock, agronomy, water rehabilitation

TROCAIRE: Seeds, water, supplementary feeding schools

World Concern: Sanitation

MSF/B: Supplementary feeding

UNICEF: UNIMIX, EPI, MCH

(8) Communications.

(a) Provide direct communications among commanders, to include non-military organizations, to facilitate decision making.

(b) Identify interoperability of communication equipment among all participants. International Maritime Satellite (INMARSAT) terminals provide an option. This satellite network can provide worldwide voice, data, and facsimile communication. This could be an excellent communications link between the military and non-military organizations, i.e. US Liaison Office and Embassies, DART, ICRC, UNHCR, inbound shipments, NGO and PVOs, etc.

(c) Establish standard operating procedures among all participants.

(d) Standardize similar reports.

(e) Exchange quality LNOs of sufficient rank to effect coordination.

(f) Plan for the increase of communication equipment, nets, commercial lines, etc., as the operation continues.

(g) Identify secure and protected communication requirements, i.e. nets, equipment, lines, operators, storage, etc.

(h) Acquire Global Positioning Systems for non-military agencies to report positions.

(i) Standardize maps used throughout participating organizations.

(9) Accountability of supplies and equipment becomes a critical and time consuming factor in HA operations. The intent is to get the correct items to the appropriate locations and people within the timeframe and priorities established. The following points may help:

(a) Acquire a copy of Disaster Assistance Logistic Information System (DALIS) or the latest software program OFDA uses to track the flow of supplies and equipment from point of origin to final destination. The system can also track cash flows. Mario Camilien, Project Manager for DALIS works for OFDA and can be reached at commercial telephone numbers 011-1-202-647-5916/5874 or 011-1-202-663-3153. Mr. Camilien is capable and willing to adjust the software program to meet the specific needs of the user.

(b) Verify all relief organizations are utilizing the same or interoperable accounting systems.

(c) Request training assistance for DALIS through the DART (See Appendix B for points of contact).

(d) Establish procedures to transfer supplies, equipment, camps, facilities, etc. to the Un, PVOs, or NGOs. This will support military disengagement.

(10) Interagency control during cross border emergencies, i.e., civilians crossing international borders, attacks against refugee camps for supplies,. Normal control in the interagency milieu is exercised by the US Ambassador to the host nation. This control is complicated when activities take place across the boundaries of several nations. Times may exist when clarity of control is obscured at the interagency level. Address the situation at the interagency level and establish command and control procedures to address cross border situations that may cause confusion.

g. Displaced Civilians (DC). Recent historical precedence indicates that DOD will not be involved in the building or running of DC camps. It is seen as having the potential for getting us involved in long-term requirements from which easy extraction is not possible. However, if there is a change to handle DC flow as part of normal operations, the following are provided:

(1) Planning for DC operations.

(a) It is essential that planning for DC operations begin as early as possible and be fully integrated into all operational plans. Even if there is an initial lack of higher headquarters guidance, this is a continuous, critical problem that requires early and in-depth planning.

(b) The military organizations tasked with this type of mission and best qualified to do this planning are CA units. With the exception of the 96th CA Bn (Abn), the rest of these units are either USA or USMC RC units. Commanders at all levels need to press for the mobilization and assignment of these units at the earliest possible opportunity.

(c) If CA units or personnel are not available, this planning can be accomplished using organic staff sections (Provost Marshall, Medical, Logistics, Engineer, etc.)

(2) Acquisition of supplies needed to support DC operations.

(a) The primary source of supply to support DC operations should come from one of three sources: Host Nation (HN) government; local sources; national and international relief agencies.

(b) Any organization that is tasked to handle DCs needs to be prepared to provide the minimum logistical support required, e.g., food, water, shelter, medical, clothing, etc.

(c) Although some of these materiels may be available through DOD channels (if authority is granted to use them), most will have to be purchased from other sources. Early, confirmed sources of funding and a mechanism for making the purchases will become critical to successful completion of the mission. Potential sources of support in this area could come from OASD/ISA (Global Affairs), or OFDA.

(d) The need to be culturally attuned to the people being assisted must be stressed. The standard military ration (Meals-Ready to Eat (MRE)) is not necessarily an acceptable solution, even to starving locals, and the provider of supplies needs to be sensitive to the peculiar needs of the population being supported. Religious requirements, cultural habits, and other factors will influence the type of food that various people consume.

(3) Establishing DC assembly points or camps with military forces.

(a) Invariably, the arrival of US military forces in an area will act as a magnet to DCs that are in need of assistance. At a minimum, the JTF needs to be prepared to assemble civilians that ask for assistance into manageable groups and hand them off to appropriate civilian or governmental relief agencies.

(b) If collection points can be set up in conjunction with these relief organizations this will facilitate the hand off and help alleviate the need for the military providing basic humanitarian support (food, water, shelter medical, etc.) If this is not possible, then the military unit needs to be prepared to provide the minimum necessary support to move civilians to DC camps. This support should be limited to just what is required to facilitate the onward movement as anything in addition will tend to slow down the movement and could cause a de facto camp to be established. Consideration should also be given to providing limited fuel support if there are civilian vehicles available and they can be used to move civilians.

(c) Should either International Law require or the National Command Authorities (NCA) direct, military forces can be utilized in direct DC camp establishment and operation. Should they be given this mission, it is of significant importance that the effort, as much as possible, conform to the camp design and operation as set forth by the UNHCR. If it is feasible to do so, this will significantly enhance the ease with which the camps can be handed off to the UNHCR or other relief agency later.

(d) It should be remembered that DCs are not, repeat not, the same as EPWs. One of the stated objectives of the US military is to end missions on terms favorable to the US Government. Leaving the local populous with a favorable impression that they are significantly better off by the US having been there, can be achieved by allowing for local leadership to continue where possible, respecting family structures, and being non-judgmental of local customs and mores

(4) Relationships with NGOs and PVO. Literally hundreds of these agencies exist and could show up in some combination in a given area of operations (AO). For example, there were as many as 40 to 45 NGO and PVOs operating in northern Iraq during operation "Provide Comfort", each jockeying for attention and support. These NGO and PVO's are all independent and usually feel no great sense of urgency to coordinate their efforts. At the same time, these organizations can do a lot to carry the DC support burden and every effort should be made to facilitate a good working relationship.

(a) Units will need to identify their point(s) of contact (POC) to provide liaison and coordination with NGOs and PVOs. The JTF should also identify a staff section for coordination with DOS and USAID. In many cases, USAID and its subset OFDA, will be able to handle much of this coordination.

(b) The type units best able to provide this expertise are CA units. Barring having CA personnel available, each unit needs to ensure that it identifies organic personnel to handle this requirement.

(5) Relationships with local governmental and police agencies. Whenever possible, the JTF should utilize the services of the local government and police forces in assisting with DCs. Where these are not able or willing to help, then the functions they could have assumed will have to be taken on by the military.

APPENDIX A
LIST OF SUPPORTING PUBLICATIONS

1. General. The following documents were used to develop this publication. Because of the frequent updating of some of the references, a publication date may not be listed for each document.

1. DOD Directives

a. DOD Dir S-3321.1, Overt Psychological Operations Conducted by the Military Services in Peacetime and in Contingencies Short of Declared War, 26 Jul 84

b. DOD Dir 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief, 4 Dec 92.

2. Joint Publications

a. Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces" ,Dec 86

b. Joint Test Pub 2-0, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, Jun 91.

c. Joint Pub 3-00.1, Joint Doctrine for Contingency Operations (Final Draft), 15 May 92.

d. Joint Pub 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.

e. Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Short of War (Proposed Final Pub), Nov 92.

f. Joint Pub 3-07.1, JTTP for Foreign Internal Defense, Sep 92.

g. Joint Pub 3-07.2, JTTP for Antiterrorism (Final Draft), Feb 92.

h. Joint Pub 3-07.3, JTTP for Peacekeeping Operations (Revised Final Draft), Aug 92.

i. Joint Pub 3-07.4, JTTP for Counterdrug Operations (Initial Draft).

j. Joint Pub 3-10, Joint Rear Area Operations.

k. Joint Pub 3-10.1, JTTP for Installation Defense.

l. Joint Pub 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.

m. Joint Pub 3-57, Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs.

n. Joint Pub 4-01, Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System.

o. Joint Pub 4-01.1, Airlift Support to Joint Operations.

p. Joint Pub 4-01.2, JTTP for Sealift Support to Joint Operations.

q. Joint Pub 4-01.5, JTTP for Water Terminal Operations.

r. Joint Pub 5.00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, Sep 91.

s. Joint Pub 6-05, Joint Communication.

3. Army Publications

a. FM 5-114, Engineer Operations Short of War, Jul 92.

b. FM 5-333, Construction Management.

c. FM 8-8, Medical Support in Joint Operations.

d. FM 24-1, Combat Communication.

e. FM 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces Operations.

f. FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations.

h. FM 80-1, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces (SF, Ranger, CA, PSYOPS, SOA).

i. FM 100-17, Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization.

j. FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces.

k. FM 100-27, Multi-Service Doctrine for Air Movement Operations.

l. "Dislocated Civilians a Handbook on Displaced Persons, Refugees and Evacuees," 354th CA Brigade, undated

m. NEWSLETTER No. 92-X, XXX92, Operations Other Than War, Volume I, Humanitarian Assistance, Center for Army Lessons Learned.

n. NEWSLETTER No. 92-X, XXX92, Operations Other Than War Volume II, Disaster Relief, Center for Army Lessons Learned.

4. Air Force Publications

a. Air Mobility Command, Commander of Mobility Forces, Handbook, May 92.

5. Marine Corps Publications

a. OH 1-5, Maritime Preposition Forces (MPF).

6. Other Publications

a. A-AF CLIC Papers

(1) LIC Instability Indicators Study, Jun 92.

(2) LIC Planner's Guide, Mar 92.

b. AARs

(1) USCINCEUR, AAR Provide Comfort, 29 Jan 92.

(2) USA John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, AAR Provide Comfort, 1 Oct 92.

(3) Joint Task Force Andrew (JTFA) After Action Report (AAR), 15 Oct 92.

(4) Marine Corps Lessons Learned Database, Special Database Search for this TTP, 7 Dec 92.

(5) Guide to Field Operations (For Disaster Response), OFDA, Version 1.0.

(6) DART Manual, Version 2.0, Apr 92.

7. Interviews

a. Commander, 1st Security Police Squadron, Langley AFB, VA, Dec 92.

b. Low Intensity Proponencies Directorate, US Army Command and General Staff College, Ft Leavenworth, KS, Dec 92.

c. Regional Bureau Chief, East Africa, Dec 92.

LAST PAGE OF APPENDIX A

APPENDIX B
KEY ORGANIZATIONS, INDIVIDUALS, AND TELEPHONE NUMBERS

US Diplomatic Mission to Somalia

Presidential Envoy to Somalia: Ambassador Robert Oakley

US Liaison Office
Continental Oil Company (CONOCO) Compound
Mogadishu, Somalia

Telephone Numbers: INMARSAT 011-873-150-5717/5720 and a direct line through DOS Operations Center, Task Force Somalia, commercial 011-1-202-647-6614.

Country Team Members to Somali Mission. As of 14 Dec 92 the members have not officially been approved. To date the list assembled by the Executive Office of the African Bureau includes:

Department of State

Donald Teitelbaum	Political Officer
John Fox	Political Officer
John Hirsch	Political Advisor
Wayne Bush	Administrative Officer
John Beaudry	Security Officer
Richard Faciglione	Communications Program Officer
Sheryl Strance	Secretary
Edwin Guard	Security Officer
Michael Mack	Security Officer
Eric Stocky	Security Officer
Glen Gershman	Security Officer

United States Information Service (USIS)

Robert R. Gosende	Special Assistant for Public Affairs to Ambassador Oakley
Frank Strovas	Public Affairs Advisor

Agency for International Development (USAID): 12 representatives, names not received in time for publication

Department of State/USAID Operations Center Task Force Somalia

Senior Representative: Ambassador Brandon Grove

Telephone Numbers: Commercial 011-1-202-647-6611/14

Bureau for Food and Humanitarian Assistance

Andrew S. Natsios
Assistant Administrator FHA/President's US Coordinator for Somali Relief
320 21st Street, NW
Room 5314-A
Washington, DC 20523-0059
Telephone Numbers: Commercial 011-1-202-647-0220
Facsimile: 011-1-202-647-0218

Office of Foreign Disaster Relief

James Kunder, Director
OFDA
Room 1262-A
C Street, NW
Washington, DC 20523
Facsimile: Commercial 011-1-202-647-5269

OFDA/Disaster Relief Division
Assistant Director
C Street, NW
Washington, DC 20523
Telephone Number: Commercial 011-1-202-647-0220

OFDA/Disaster Relief Division
Operations Officer
Telephone Number: Commercial 011-1-202-647-5916

Disaster Assistance Response Team

Team Leaders:
Nairobi, Kenya - Kate Farnsworth
Mogadishu, Somalia - James Kunder
Mombassa, Kenya -

DART Locations:

Nairobi, Kenya
US Embassy
Noi/Haili Selassie Avenue
PO Box 30137
APO NY 09675 (Nairobi, Kenya)
Telephone Number: Commercial 011-254-2-333-834
Facsimile: Commercial 011-254-2-340-838

Mombassa, Kenya
US Consulate
Palli House
Nyerere Avenue
PO Box 88079
Mombassa, Kenya
Telephone Numbers: Commercial 011-254-11-315-101/2/3

Mogadishu, Somalia
US Liaison Office
Continental Oil Company (CONOCO) Compound
Mogadishu, Somalia
Telephone Numbers: INMARSAT 011-873-150-5717/5720 and a direct line through DOS Operation Center, Task Force Somalia

DART Representatives/Location (as of 8 Dec 92)

USAID/FHA/OFDA Director: James Kunder, Mogadishu

USAID/FHA/OFDA Assistant Director of the Disaster Relief Division: William Garvelink, Mogadishu

Mogadishu Team Leader: Kate Farnsworth

Mogadishu Assistant Team Leader: Tom Dolan, Nairobi

Administrative Officer (Manages and supervises DART fiscal, contracting, and administrative activities): Tom Bordorne, Nairobi

Coordinator, (Coordinates DART functions with the DOD in Mombassa and Kenya): Rudy Tantare, Nairobi

Center for Disease Control (Responsible to survey nutritional aspects of the affected population): Patrick Moore and Lynn Quenemoen, Nairobi

Advisor, (Supervises the operation of the DOD emergency airlift and coordinates with the cooperating partners: Jan Westcott, Mogadishu

Information Officer: Mikaela Meredith, Mombassa

Logistics Coordinator: Ted White, Mombassa

Mombassa Operations Specialists: Evan Mac Gibbon and Leslie Peverall, Mombassa

Technical Food Specialist: Dwight Schwartzdruber, Nairobi

Private Voluntary Organization Coordinator: Elizabeth Lukasavich, Mogadishu

Technical Team Coordinator: Fred Cuny, Nairobi

DOD Liaison (Coordinates with the US Military in Mombassa, Kenya): LT COL Bruce Mackey

Coordinator for Somalis living in Kenya: Lauren Landis-Guzman

Disaster Assistance Logistics Information System

OFDA Point of Contact

Information Support(LAI)
Attention: Systems Analyst, Mr. Mario Camilien
C Street, NW
Washington, DC 20523
Telephone Numbers: Commercial 011-1-202-647-5916/5874 or
011-1-202-663-3153

US European Command Point of Contact

Major Stevens
Headquarters US European Command
Office of Analysis and Simulation (ECCS-AE)
Vaihingen, Germany
Telephone Numbers: Commercial 49-711-680-5353/5354 or
DSN 430-5353/54
Facsimile: DSN 430-5296
Secure STU-III Facsimile: DSN 430-5353/54/55

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

Main Headquarters

UNHCR
C P 2500
1211 Geneva 2 Depot
Switzerland
Telephone Number: Commercial 022-739-8111

Delegation to the United Nations

UNHCR
Room 2610
1 United Nations Plaza
New York, NY
Telephone Numbers: Commercial 011-1-212-963-2909/6200

Delegation to the United States

UNHCR
1718 Connecticut Avenue NW
Suite 200
Washington, DC 20009
Telephone Numbers: Commercial 011-1-202-387-8546
Facsimile: 011-1-202-387-9038

International Committee of the Red Cross, Regional Office

Dominique Gross, Chief of Delegation
Dennis Pritt Road
PO Box 73226
Nairobi, Kenya
Telephone Numbers: Commercial 011-254-2-723-963/4/5
Facsimile: 011-254-2-715-598

Note: Numerous legal consideration limit, and in some cases restrict, the direct coordination between the ICRC and the Joint Task Force Commander with respect to displaced civilians, detainees, and enemy prisoners of war. The classification of personnel and the flow of information must be clarified through legal channels.

Selected Key Transportation Telephone Numbers

USTRANSCOM Crisis Action Team

	DSN	Red Switch
Executive	576-8705	6292

MTMC Emergency Operations Center

	DSN
Center	289-1125

MSC Crisis Action Team

	DSN
Executive	288-0023

HQ AMC Crisis Action Team

	DSN
Director (CATD)	576-2289
Executive (CATE)	576-1712/2289
Transportation (CATT)	576-6352
Logistics (CATL)	576-6708

Tanker/Airlift Control Center (TACC)

	DSN
Senior Controller	576-1705
LOCC	576-1763
APCC	576-1709
MSPO	576-3570/2087
FLOW CELL	576-3388

USTRANSCOM (AMC) LIAISONS

	DSN
USLANTCOM (OL B, 21 AF)	564-6646
USCENTCOM	968-6513
USEUCOM	430-8517/7243
USSOUTHCOM (61 MAG/CC)	284-5540
USSOCOM (JOPES)	968-4115
USFORSCOM	367-6418/5497
USPACOM	456-0830/0530
HQACC LNO	574-5947

CENTAF LNO	965-3888
SOUTHAF LNO	685-2931
PACOM LNO	447-0414
USAFE LNO	480-6063
I MEF	365-6465
II MEF	484-1014/1028
III MEF	622-7788/7789

GLOSSARY

PART I - ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AAA	arrival and assembly area
A-AF CLIC	Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict
AACG	arrival airfield aontrol aroup
AAOG	arrival and assembley operations group
AAR	after-action report
AASP	Arrival Assembly Support Party
Abn	airborne
ADVON	advance echelon
AECC	Aeromedical Evacuation Control Center
AFCC	Air Force Component Command (USAF)
AFMIC	Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center
ACC	Air Combat Command
AFFOR	Air Force Forces
AICF	Action Internationale Contre la Faim (French NGO)
ALSA	Air-Land-Sea Application Center
AMC	Air Mobility Command (USAF) or Army Material Command (USA)
AO	area of operation
APOD	aerial port of debarkation
APOE	aerial port of embarkation
ASD/ISA	Assistant Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs

B	Belgium
Bn	battalion
BOG	Beach Operations Group

C2	command and control
C3	command, control, and communications
CA	civil affairs
CALL	Center for Army Lessons Learned
CAP	Crisis Action Procedures
CARE	Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere
CATF	Commander, Amphibious Task Force
CI	counterintelligence
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CISP	Cooperazione Internationale (Italian NGO)
CINC	Commander in Chief (Unified or Specified Command)
CJCS	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJTF	Commander, Joint Task Force or (COMJTF)
CMO	civil-military operations
CMOC	civil-military operations center
CMPF	Commander, Maritime Prepositioning Force
COCOM	Combatant Command
COMAMC	Commander Air Mobility Command (USAF)
COMMOBFOR	Commander Mobility Forces (USAF)
COMSEC	communications security
CONUS	Continental United States

CPX	command-post exercise
CRAF	Civil Reserve Air Fleet
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
DALIS	Disaster Assistance Logistics Information System
DART	Disaster Assistance Response Team
DC	displaced civilians
DIRMOBFOR	Director of Mobility Forces (USAF)
DNBI	disease and non-battle injury
DOD	Department of Defense
DP	displaced person
DOS	Department of State or days of supply
DSN	digital switched network
EAC	echelons above corps
EEI	essential elements of information
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
EPI	expanded program of immunizations
EPW	enemy prisoner of war
EST	estimate
F	France
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FF	flight ferry
FHA	Bureau for Food and Humanitarian Assistance
FID	foreign internal defense
FIE	fly-in-echelon
FM	field manual
FMF	Fleet Marine Force
GDSS	global decision support system
H	Holland
HCA	humanitarian and civic assistance
HQ	Headquarters
HN	host nation
HNS	host nation support
HSS	health service support
HUMINT	human intelligence
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDAD	internal defense and development
IMC	International Medical Corps
INMARSAT	International Maritime Satellite System
IRC	International Rescue Committee
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCSE	Joint Communication Support Element
JFACC	Joint Force Air Component Commander
JMC	Joint Movement Center
JMRO	Joint Medical Regulating Office
JOC	Joint Operations Center
JOPES	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JOPS	Joint Operation Planning System
JPTL	Joint Prioritized Target List

JRCC	Joint Rescue Coordination Center
JSOTF	Joint Special Operations Task Force
JTCB	Joint Targeting Coordination Board
JTF	Joint Task Force
JTFA	Joint Task Force Andrew
JTTP	joint tactics, techniques, and procedures
JULLS	Joint Universal Lessons Learned System
LIC	low intensity conflict
LNO	liaison officer
LPG	LIC Planner's Guide
MAGTF	Marine Air Ground Task Force
MEB	Marine Expeditionary Brigade
MCH	maternal-child health (program)
MHE	materials handling equipment
MOG	mazimum on ground
MPF	Maritime Prepositioning Force
MPS	Maritime Prepositioning Ships
MRE	meal ready-to-eat
MSC	Military Sealift Command
MSF	Medicins Sans Forntieres (Doctors without Borders)
MT	metric ton
MTMC	Militry Traffic Management Command
NCA	national command authorities (US)
NEO	non-combatant evacuation operation
NGO	non-governmental organization
NSE	Naval Support Element
OASD/ISA	Office, Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs
OCONUS	outside Continental United States
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
O&M	operations and maintenance
OPCON	operational control
OPD	outpatient department
OPP	off-load preparation party
OPSEC	operations security
ORS	oral rehydration solution
OSI	Office of Special Investigations
PDC	Product Development Center
PKO	peacekeeping operations
PO	Post Office
POG	port operations group
PSYOP	psychological operations
PVO	private volunteer organizations
RC	reserve component
ROE	rules of engagement
RSI	rationalization, standardization, and interoperability

S	Sweden
SAR	search and rescue
SAS	Somalia NGO (trash collection)
SCF	Save the Children Fund
SF	special forces
SOA	special operations aviation
SOF	special operations forces
SOP	standard operating procedure
SWEDRELIEF	Swedish Church Relief
TACC	tanker airlift control center (USAF)
TALCE	tanker/airlift control element (USAF)
TCC	transportation component commands
TOR	terms of reference
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command (USA)
TRANSCOM	Transportation Command
TTP	tactics, techniques, and procedures
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAFF	Unified Action Armed Forces
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children Fund
UNIMIX	porridge-like grain mixture
UNOSOM	United Nations Operations in Somalia
US	United States
USA	United States Army
USACE	United States Army Corps of Engineers
USAF	United States Air Force
USAID	United States Agency of International Development
USC	United States Code
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
USCINCCENT	Commander in Chief, US Central Command
USCINCTRANS	Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command
USEUCOM	United States European Command
USIA	United States Information Agency
USIS	United States Information Service
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USN	United States Navy
UW	unconventional warfare
WC	World Concern
WFP	World Food Program
WVRD	World Vision Relief and Development
WWMCCS	Worldwide Military Command and Control System

PART II - DEFINITIONS

civil affairs. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and non-governmental, and the civilian population in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives. Civil affairs may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. (Joint Pub 3-57)

civil-military operations. Activities in support of military operations which embrace the relationship between the military forces and civilian authorities and population, and the development of favorable emotions, attitudes, or behavior in neutral, friendly, or hostile groups. (Joint Pub 3-07, Proposed Final Pub, No 92)

combatant command. Exercised only by commanders of unified and specified combatant commands, COCOM is the authority of a combatant commander to perform the functions of command over assigned forces that involve organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. COCOM should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations; normally this authority is exercised through the Service component commander. COCOM gives full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the CINC considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. COCOM includes the authority of OPCON. (Joint Pub 0-2)

dislocated civilian. This is a generic term describing a civilian who for any reason is not at his home and requires some form of help until he can re-establish himself at home or elsewhere. The term includes, but is not limited to: displaced persons, refugees, evacuees, stateless persons, and internees. (Dislocated Civilians a Handbook on Displaced Persons, Refugees and Evacuees, 354th CA Brigade)

displaced person. A civilian who is involuntarily outside the boundaries of his or her own country. (Dislocated Civilians a Handbook on Displaced Persons, Refugees and Evacuees, 354th CA Brigade)

evacuee. A civilian removed from his/her place of residence by military direction for reasons of his own security or the requirements of the military situation. ("Dislocated Civilians a Handbook on Displaced Persons, Refugees and Evacuees," 354th CA Brigade) force protection. Security program designed to protect soldiers, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment in all locations and situations. (Joint Pub 5-03.2)

foreign disaster. An act of nature (such as a flood, drought, fire, hurricane, earthquake, volcanic eruption, or epidemic), or an act of man (such as riot, violence, civil strife, explosion, fire, or epidemic), which is or threatens to be of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant United States foreign disaster relief to a foreign country, or foreign persons, or to an international organization. (DOD Dir 5100.46, 4 Dec 75)

foreign disaster relief. Prompt aid which can be used to alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster victims. (Normally, it includes humanitarian services and transportation; the provision of food, clothing, medicine, beds and bedding; temporary shelter and housing; the furnishing of medical materiel, medical and technical personnel; and making repairs to essential services.) (DOD Dir 5100.46, 4 Dec 75)

foreign internal defense. Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. (Joint Pub 1-02)

humanitarian and civic assistance. Assistance provided in conjunction with military operations, either authorized by 10 USC 401, funded by operations and maintenance (O&M) in the case of de minimus HCA, or HCA in conjunction with CJCS exercises as authorized by the Stevens Amendment. Such assistance is limited to (1) medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country; (2) construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; (3) well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and (4) rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. (Joint Pub 3-07.1, Final Pub, Sep 92)

instruments of national power. All the means (political/diplomatic, economic, informational, and military) that can be employed in the pursuit of national objectives. (Joint Pub 3-07, Proposed Final Pub, No 92)

internal defense and development. The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society. Also called IDAD strategy. Also called IDAD.

joint task force. A force composed of assigned or attached elements of the Army, the Navy or the Marine Corps, and the Air Force, or two or more of these Services, which is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense or by the commander of a unified command, a specified command, or an existing joint task force. (Joint Pub 1-02)

military civic action. The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (US forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.) (Joint Pub 1-02)

military operations short of war. The range of military actions required by the National Command Authorities, except those associated with major combat operations conducted pursuant to a declaration of war or authorized by the War Powers Limitation Act, in support of national security interests and objectives. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before and after war. (Joint Pub 3-07, Proposed Final Pub, No 92)

operational control. Control exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. OPCON is inherent in COCOM and is the authority to perform the functions of command over subordinate forces that involve organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. OPCON includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. OPCON should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations; normally, this authority is exercised through the Service component commanders. OPCON normally gives full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. OPCON does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. (Joint Pub 0-2)

peacekeeping. Operations using military forces and/or civilian personnel at the request of the parties to a dispute to help supervise a cease-fire agreement and/or separate the parties. (Joint Pub 3-07.3, Revised Final Draft, Dec 92)

peacemaking. Diplomatic process of arranging an end to disputes and solving their underlying causes. (Joint Pub 3-07.3, Revised Final Draft, Dec 92)

peace-building. Post-conflict diplomatic and military action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. (Joint Pub 3-07.3, Revised Final Draft, Dec 92)

peace-enforcement. Military intervention to forcefully restore peace between belligerents, who may be engaged in combat. (Joint Pub 3-07.3, Revised Final Draft, Dec 92)

preventive diplomacy. Diplomatic actions, taken in advance of a predictable crisis, aimed at resolving disputes before violence breaks out. (Joint Pub 3-07.3, Revised Final Draft, Dec 92)

refugee. A civilian who, by reason of real or imagined danger, has left his home to seek safety elsewhere. (Dislocated Civilians a Handbook on Displaced Persons, Refugees and Evacuees, 354th CA Brigade) low intensity conflict. Political-military confrontation between contending states or groups covering conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contains regional and global security implications. Also called LIC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

National Command Authorities. The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. (Joint Pub 1-02)

peacekeeping. ** Operations using military forces and/or civilian personnel at the request of the parties to a dispute to help supervise a cease-fire agreement and/or separate the parties.

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peace-enforcement. ** Military intervention to forcefully restore peace between belligerents, who may be engaged in combat.

preventive diplomacy. ** Diplomatic actions, taken in advance of a predictable crisis, aimed at resolving disputes before violence breaks out.

psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable the originator's objectives. Also called PSYOP. (Joint Pub 1-02)

sabotage. An act or acts with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of a country by willfully injuring or destroying, or attempting to injure or destroy, any national defense or war material, premises or utilities, to include human and natural resources. (Joint Pub 1-02)

terrorism. The calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (Joint Pub 3-07.2)

United States Country Team. The senior, in-country, United States coordinating and supervising body, headed by the Chief of the United States diplomatic mission, usually an ambassador, and composed of the senior member of each represented United States department or agency. (Joint Pub 1-02)

** Upon final approval of this publication, this term will be included in Joint Pub 1-02.

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